DiStiso ex rel. DiStiso v. Cook
691 F.3d 226
| 2d Cir. | 2012Background
- Plaintiff Robin DiStiso sued the Town of Wolcott, its Board of Education, and school personnel under §1981, §1983, and Connecticut law for alleged discrimination related to Nicholas’s kindergarten/first-grade enrollment and harassment.
- Defendants removed the case to federal court, which dismissed several claims, leaving §1983 deliberate-indifference claims against Wakelee principal John Cook, kindergarten teacher Jacquelyn Uccello, and first-grade teacher Tammy Couture.
- District court denied summary judgment on qualified immunity; on appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, directing remand for proceedings consistent with its ruling.
- Evidence included Nicholas’s 5–6 year memories of racial name-calling (e.g., “nigger,” “blackie”) and several incidents of physical misbehavior, plus parental complaints and diaries/letters.
- Connecticut CHRO investigation found no reasonable cause; the opinion evaluates whether the defendants had actual knowledge and if their responses were clearly unreasonable under Gant and related due-process standards.
- The court’s disposition: Uccello and Cook not entitled to qualified immunity on kindergarten name-calling; but qualified immunity affirmed for later, non-explicitly-linked physical misbehavior; Couture also entitled to qualified immunity on the same grounds; case remanded for entry of judgment consistent with the opinion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Deliberate indifference to kindergarten name-calling (Uccello, Cook) | DiStiso contends there was known, racially motivated harassment. | Uccello/Cook argue no clearly established, actual knowledge of racial motivation. | Not entitled to qualified immunity; triable issues exist. |
| Deliberate indifference to racially motivated physical misbehavior (all defendants) | Defendants knew of harassment and should have acted; linked to race. | No evidence linking later misbehavior to race; insufficient actual knowledge. | Qualified immunity available; no clearly established link; remand for judgment on this aspect. |
| Appropriate standard for evaluating qualified immunity in this context | Davis/Gant standards apply to color of harassment and knowledge. | Qual. immunity requires case-specific, not broad, analysis. | Court uses Gant framework; not proceeding beyond essential elements on issues presented. |
| Whether the Davis severity standard applies to equal-protection deliberate indifference claims | Harassment may be severe, pervasive and offensive under Davis. | Unclear if Davis standard applies to equal protection; requires cautious use. | Court discusses but does not resolutely apply Davis; proceeds with Gant-based analysis. |
Key Cases Cited
- Gant ex rel. Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 195 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 1999) (establishes deliberate indifference elements for §1983 equal protection claims)
- Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (U.S. 1999) (severe, pervasive harassment standard in Davis context; informs severity discussion)
- Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (U.S. 1977) (requires discriminatory purpose to sustain an equal-protection violation)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (U.S. 2001) (structured the two-step qualified immunity inquiry (contextualized here))
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (U.S. 2009) (permits skipping to the second step when clearly warranted)