249 P.3d 444
Kan.2011Background
- During 2007, Kansas enacted the Expanded Lottery Act (S.B. 66) authorizing certain gaming facilities and electronic gaming; the Act became effective April 19, 2007.
- The Act defines ‘gray machines’ and restricts ownership and public access to such devices; prior related cases upheld Act’s constitutionality as to lottery ownership/operation.
- Plaintiffs own or lease amusement machines in Wyandotte County; they challenged K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 74-8702(g), 74-8750(d), and 74-8761 as unconstitutional.
- Director letters warned retailers that gray machines are illegal; the Lottery and Racing & Gaming Commission may confiscate noncompliant devices.
- District court granted summary judgment for the State, finding no vagueness; plaintiffs appealed under 60-2102(b)(2).
- Court reviews statute de novo, examining whether 74-8702(g) is vague or overbroad and whether combination with enforcement provisions is unconstitutional.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 74-8702(g) is vague under due process | Dissmeyer argures vagueness; criminalizes ordinary devices. | State contends statute is clear and capable of application. | Statute not unconstitutionally vague. |
| Whether 74-8702(g) unconstitutionally overbroad | Overbreadth bars vast class of ordinary devices. | Statute targets gambling devices, not protected conduct. | Statute overbreadth; unconstitutional as applied to gray machines and enforcement. |
| Whether incorporation of gambling-device definition from 21-4302(d) is required | Incorporation clarifies gray-machine scope. | Statute stands independently; no need to borrow 21-4302(d). | No incorporation required; statute may stand without 21-4302(d). |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Richardson, 289 Kan. 118 (2009) (statutory vagueness standards for due process)
- State v. Durst, 235 Kan. 62 (1984) (distinction between illegal per se vs. potentially lawful property)
- State v. Whitesell, 270 Kan. 259 (2000) (overbreadth analysis framework)
- State v. McAffry, 263 Kan. 521 (1997) (overbreadth concerns linking property to protected activities)
- State v. Bonner, 290 Kan. 290 (2010) (disjunctive 'or' interpretation in statutory construction)
- State v. Johnson, 289 Kan. 870 (2009) (statutory interpretation and vagueness considerations)
- State v. Wiegand, 275 Kan. 841 (2003) (application of statutory definitions to devices)
- Martens v. Smith, 279 Kan. 242 (2005) (overbreadth and protected-activity considerations)