Dishon McNary v. Marcus Hardy, 708 F.3d 905

McNary, serving two life sentences for first-degree murder and related counts, challenged state court convictions via federal habeas corpus after state remedies failed.
Key suppression issues: whether statements to police were involuntary and obtained in custody; suppression hearing testimony and prior custody determinations affected admissibility.
Trial evidence included McNary’s intoxication and high-speed flight after a tailing vehicle, leading to three killings in a hit-and-run.
Defense alleged ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel for, among other things, mismanaging custody and voluntary intoxication issues.
Illinois appellate courts upheld trial strategy on custody-related suppression and rejected the voluntary intoxication defense; federal court denied habeas relief under AEDPA.
Underscored standard: review under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) is highly deferential and “doubly deferential” to state court determinations of Strickland claims.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the state court reasonably applied Strickland to trial counsel’s performance	McNary argues trial counsel’s failures (not calling Carla, etc.) were prejudicial	Illinois Appellate Court found counsel’s decisions reasonable and non-prejudicial	Yes, reasonable application; no prejudice shown
Whether failure to call Carla McNary at suppression hearing was ineffective assistance	Carla’s testimony could have affected custody finding	Record showed investigations were reasonable; Carla’s testimony unlikely to change outcome	No prejudice; reasonable in context
Whether failure to question Officer Martinez about custody was ineffective assistance	Questioning would clarify custody status	Martinez’s view irrelevant to custody; McNary unconscious at relevant times	No error; reasonable strategy
Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for not appealing denial of voluntary intoxication instruction	Instruction denial was obvious error	State law defense meritless; appellate strategy reasonable	Reasonable strategic choice; no Sixth Amendment violation
Whether exhaustion prevents consideration of Hardesty-related claims	Underlying facts not properly exhausted in state court	Exhaustion requirements not satisfied; procedurally barred	Unexhausted; claims not reviewable

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (establishes two-prong standard for ineffective assistance)
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (U.S. 2011) (highly deferential AEDPA review of Strickland)
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111 (U.S. 2009) (doubles and strengthens deference in habeas review)
Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (U.S. 2011) (limits evidentiary consideration to state-court record on review)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (U.S. 2000) (clarifies unreasonable application of clearly established law)
Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (U.S. 2002) (explains contrary/ unreasonable application standards)
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (U.S. 2005) (premised on defense counsel’s pretrial investigations (distinguished))
Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (U.S. 2012) (evidentiary scrutiny related to trial procedures)
United States v. Draves, 103 F.3d 1328 (7th Cir. 1997) (illustrates appellate review of counsel’s conduct)