Discipline of Brian Steffensen
373 P.3d 186
Utah2016Background
- Brian Steffensen, an attorney, entered into a diversion agreement in 2010 after a Utah State Tax Commission investigation that led to felony tax-related charges.
- The Utah Office of Professional Conduct (OPC) charged Steffensen with violating Rule 8.4(b) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct for committing "criminal act[s]" that reflect adversely on fitness to practice law.
- In district court OPC proved the Rule 8.4(b) violation by a preponderance of the evidence; the court acknowledged OPC had not met the criminal beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard for the underlying tax offenses.
- Steffensen appealed interlocutorily, arguing due process required proof beyond a reasonable doubt for a discipline charge based on committing a criminal act.
- The Utah Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability (Rule 14-517(b)) prescribe a preponderance standard for formal misconduct complaints; a higher standard (clear and convincing) is specified only for interim suspension motions under Rule 14-518.
- The Supreme Court of Utah affirmed: Rule 14-517 controls, preponderance is the applicable standard, and Steffensen’s due process argument did not displace the explicit rule.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicable standard of proof for an attorney-discipline charge based on a "criminal act" under Rule 8.4(b) | OPC: Rule 14-517(b) governs formal complaints and requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence | Steffensen: Due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt (or higher standard) when discipline is predicated on a criminal act | Held: Rule 14-517(b) controls; preponderance of the evidence is the proper standard |
| Whether the Due Process Clause mandates a higher standard than the rule provides | OPC: Existing rule satisfies due process; no traditional due-process principle compels higher standard | Steffensen: Discipline is quasi-criminal; loss of license is severe so due process requires criminal standard | Held: Due process does not override explicit rule; Steffensen failed to tie his challenge to established due-process tenets |
| Whether Rule 8.4(b)’s reference to "criminal act" implicitly imports criminal proof standard | Steffensen: The term "criminal act" could imply the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard | OPC: An implicit reference cannot override an explicit procedural rule | Held: Explicit standard in Rule 14-517 controls over any implicit suggestion in Rule 8.4(b) |
| Whether courts may effectively amend procedural rules via adjudication | Steffensen: Policy favors higher protection for attorneys; adjudicative change justified | OPC/Court: Rulemaking, not adjudication, is proper avenue for changing proof standards | Held: Court declines to alter rule by decision; rule amendment is the appropriate path |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968) (disbarment is punitive and protects the public)
- Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535 (1988) (specific statutory provisions control over more general ones)
- Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148 (1976) (discussion of interpretive tensions between competing provisions)
- Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921) (Due Process Clause does not require ideal procedural systems)
- Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (due process assessed by reference to settled usages and proceedings)
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (balancing test for procedural due process protections)
- In re Discipline of Babilis, 951 P.2d 207 (Utah 1997) (attorney discipline is civil, not criminal)
- In re Egbune, 971 P.2d 1065 (Colo. 1999) (adopted a higher standard of proof in attorney-discipline context)
- In re Summer, 105 P.3d 848 (Or. 2005) (adopted clear-and-convincing standard for certain discipline claims)