Disabato v. South Carolina Ass'n of School Administrators, 746 S.E.2d 329

SCASA is a South Carolina non-profit that lobbies on education policy; a citizen (Disabato) requested internal records and communications under the South Carolina FOIA.
SCASA refused, claiming it was not a "public body" subject to FOIA and that FOIA's disclosure/open‑meeting requirements unconstitutionally burden its First Amendment speech and associational rights.
Disabato sued for declaration and injunction; SCASA moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) asserting a facial First Amendment challenge to FOIA as applied to politically active nonprofits.
The circuit court assumed SCASA was a public body, held FOIA burdened First Amendment rights, applied a heightened (exacting/strict) scrutiny and dismissed the complaint.
The Supreme Court reversed: it assumed (but did not decide) SCASA was a public body at this stage, held FOIA does implicate speech and association but is content‑neutral and survives intermediate scrutiny as applied.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Disabato)	Defendant's Argument (SCASA)	Held
Whether SCASA is a “public body” under FOIA	Complaint alleges SCASA is a public body; FOIA should apply	SCASA did not dispute allegation for dismissal but contests application in substance	Court assumes but does not decide on appeal; left for discovery/remand
Whether FOIA implicates SCASA’s First Amendment rights	FOIA does not affect protected private speech/association	FOIA compels disclosure and open meetings, chilling speech and association	FOIA does implicate rights (right not to speak; associational privacy)
Proper level of scrutiny for FOIA’s disclosure/open‑meeting rules	Exacting/strict scrutiny not warranted outside electoral disclosure context	FOIA is content‑neutral and serves non‑speech‑related purposes; intermediate scrutiny applies	Intermediate scrutiny (and Clingman associational standard equivalent to intermediate) applies
Whether FOIA survives that scrutiny as applied to politically active nonprofits	FOIA overbroadly burdens private speech and association; imposes unconstitutional condition when applied to entities receiving any public funds	FOIA advances important interests (transparency, preventing fraud/corruption, public trust), narrowly framed by exemptions and limited application to entities supported en masse by public funds	FOIA survives intermediate scrutiny; does not violate First Amendment as applied to SCASA at dismissal stage (but whether SCASA is a public body left unresolved)

Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (recognizes a right not to speak publicly)
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (associational privacy; disclosure may require compelling interest where disclosure risks harassment)
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (two‑step inquiry: whether law implicates First Amendment and, if so, what scrutiny applies)
John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010) (upheld election‑context disclosure under exacting scrutiny; supports transparency interest)
Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (upheld political disclosure requirements under exacting scrutiny; emphasized electorate’s interest in knowing funding sources)
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (distinguishes content‑based vs. content‑neutral regulation and intermediate scrutiny test)
Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581 (2005) (associational claims: severe burdens trigger strict scrutiny; incidental burdens permit a lesser standard requiring important interest and reasonable, nondiscriminatory means)
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (discusses disclosure and associational privacy; harassment standard for heightened protection)
Weston v. Carolina Research & Dev. Found., 303 S.C. 398 (1991) (interprets FOIA’s "public funds" language; holds FOIA can reach private entities supported by public funds en masse)