Dionte Tyler v. DH Capital Management, Inc.
736 F.3d 455
| 6th Cir. | 2013Background
- DHC filed a state-court debt-collection complaint against Tyler seeking the Chase credit-card balance plus 21% interest and fees; the complaint was filed March 23, 2011 but Tyler was not served until October 12, 2011.
- Tyler filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy on June 28, 2011 and received a discharge on October 4, 2011; he did not list the then-unserved DHC suit or FDCPA/usury claims on his schedules or amend after service.
- After learning of the bankruptcy, DHC filed a voluntary notice of dismissal without prejudice on October 18, 2011; the state court entered an order dismissing the case on October 26, 2011.
- Tyler later sued DHC in federal court (class action) alleging FDCPA violations (including that filing suit to collect an allegedly usurious rate was an unlawful attempt to collect) and Kentucky usury violations stemming from the 21% interest demand.
- The district court dismissed Tyler’s suit on two grounds: (1) his FDCPA/usury claims were compulsory counterclaims he failed to assert in the state action (res judicata/Rule 13), and (2) the claims were pre-petition causes of action and thus property of the bankruptcy estate (only the trustee could prosecute).
- The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part: it held Tyler’s claims were not barred as unpled counterclaims but were property of the bankruptcy estate because the violations occurred pre-petition or at the time DHC filed suit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether unpled compulsory counterclaims are barred after the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the action without prejudice | Tyler: dismissal occurred before he had an opportunity to plead; Rule 13 bar should not apply because the action was dismissed without prejudice and before adjudication | DHC: Tyler elected to forgo compulsory counterclaims; Rule 13/claim-preclusion principles bar relitigation | Court: Not barred — voluntary pre-answer dismissal closed the case and dismissal without prejudice is not an adjudication on the merits, so Rule 13/claim preclusion do not prohibit Tyler’s suit |
| Whether FDCPA/usury claims became property of the bankruptcy estate (and thus only trustee may pursue) | Tyler: claims did not accrue until he was served; therefore they are post-petition and not estate property | DHC: filing of the complaint (and usury pre-dating the petition) gave Tyler a pre-petition interest; claims are estate property | Court: Claims are estate property. Usury claim accrued pre-petition; FDCPA claim can accrue at filing of the collection complaint (pre-service) and thus is part of the estate |
| Effect of failing to list/schedule the claims on bankruptcy forms | Tyler: failure to list was inadvertent and should not strip him of ability to pursue after discharge | DHC: failure to schedule shows Tyler lacked standing and trustee controls the claims | Court: Failure to schedule does not alter §541 definition but prevents judicial abandonment — unscheduled claims remain estate property and trustee retains exclusive authority unless trustee abandons them |
Key Cases Cited
- Estate of Barney v. PNC Bank, N.A., 714 F.3d 920 (6th Cir. 2013) (standard of review for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal)
- Roberts v. Hamer, 655 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2011) (pleading-acceptance and plausibility standard)
- Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467 (U.S. 1974) (unpled compulsory counterclaim barred under Rule 13)
- United States v. Snider, 779 F.2d 1151 (6th Cir. 1985) (no requirement to assert counterclaim when movant prevails on pre-answer motion)
- Whaley v. Whitaker Bank, Inc., 254 S.W.3d 825 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008) (voluntary notice-of-dismissal under Ky. R. Civ. P. 41.01 is self-executing and effective immediately)
- Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (U.S. 1995) (FDCPA applies to litigation activity)
- Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (U.S. 1966) (generous construction of "property" under bankruptcy law)
- Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107 (10th Cir. 2002) (FDCPA statute-of-limitations accrual at service of process — contrasted by court)
- Naas v. Stolman, 130 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 1997) (FDCPA accrual at filing — contrasted by court)
- In re Cannon, 277 F.3d 838 (6th Cir. 2002) (trustee's exclusive authority to pursue pre-petition causes of action)