647 F.3d 1109
11th Cir.2012Background
- Dionne worked as a warehouse clerk for Floormasters Enterprises, Inc. from Sept 19 to Nov 27, 2007, under manager Molsick who controlled his pay and duties.
- Dionne filed a §216(b) overtime claim on March 24, 2008 on his behalf and for other clerks.
- Floormasters tendered full payment of overtime, liquidated damages, and interest totaling $637.98 on April 23, 2008, and sought dismissal with prejudice.
- Dionne opposed, asserting damages could exceed Floormasters’ estimate; the district court denied the tender as incomplete as discovery had not begun.
- Floormasters again tendered full payment based on Dionne’s May 6, 2008 affidavit, asserting mootness; Dionne conceded mootness but sought to reserve attorney’s fees.
- The district court granted dismissal with prejudice on June 4, 2008 and later denied Dionne’s §216(b) attorney’s fees request in 2009; this court approved an appeal under 28 U.S.C. §1291.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether mootness dismissal with full back-pay precludes §216(b) fees. | Dionne contends he is a prevailing party due to the tender and dismissal. | Floormaster contends no judgment in Dionne’s favor was entered; no prevailing-party status. | No; dismissal moots the case but does not award judgment, so no prevailing party under §216(b). |
| Whether Buckhannon applies to deny catalyst-based fee recovery. | Buckhannon bars fee awards without a judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship. | Buckhannon should not change the outcome; tender creates relief. | Yes; Buckhannon vitiates catalyst-based recovery; no prevailing party here. |
| Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying fees when no judgment was entered. | Plaintiff seeks fees as prevailing party. | Defendant argues no judgment, hence no fee entitlement. | Affirmed; not a prevailing party, so no §216(b) fees. |
| Whether cases like Goss, Smyth, Truesdell support Dionne’s position. | Dionne cites several to support his prevailing-party claim. | These cases do not apply where there was no judicial imprimatur or settlement approval. | Unpersuasive; Buckhannon controls; no ruling in Dionne’s favor. |
Key Cases Cited
- Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (Supreme Court 2001) (catalyst theory rejected; prevailing party requires judicial relief or settlement with court approval)
- Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350 (11th Cir. 1982) (settlement approval matters for fee awards under FLSA/Buckhannon context)
- Smyth ex rel. Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2002) (district court must retain jurisdiction or incorporate settlement terms for fees)
- Truesdell v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 290 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2002) (prevailing-party analysis depends on court-ordered settlement terms)
- Goss v. Killian Oaks House of Learning, 248 F. Supp. 2d 1162 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (settlement not approved or judicially sanctioned; not a prevailing party)
- Barrios v. California Interscholastic Federation, 277 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2002) (settlement-based fees require enforceable agreement)