Dimott v. United States
881 F.3d 232
1st Cir.2018Background
- Three consolidated §2255 petitions by Richard Dimott, Wayne Collamore, and Charles Casey challenge ACCA sentence enhancements based on prior Maine burglary convictions after Johnson v. United States (Johnson II) and Mathis v. United States.
- Each petitioner pled guilty to federal offenses (felon-in-possession; Collamore also escape) and received ACCA enhancements; none appealed their sentences at the time.
- Petitions were filed in 2016, after Johnson II (invalidating ACCA’s residual clause); petitioners argue Mathis means Maine burglary is non-generic and thus cannot qualify under the ACCA enumerated clause.
- District courts dismissed all three petitions as procedurally barred/timely: Dimott and Collamore were found to have been sentenced under the ACCA’s enumerated clause; Casey’s record was silent but the district court found procedural default of his Johnson II claim.
- The First Circuit affirmed: all three petitions are time-barred because they raise Mathis-based challenges (not Johnson II), and petitioners failed to show their original enhancements were dependent solely on the now-invalid residual clause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §2255(f)(3) one-year period is triggered by Johnson II for these petitions | Petitioners: Johnson II is the newly recognized, retroactive right that makes petitions timely | Government: Claims actually rest on Mathis (non-retroactive) so §2255(f)(3) does not apply | Held: Not triggered — petitions raise Mathis issues, not Johnson II, so untimely |
| Whether petitioners’ ACCA enhancements were imposed under the residual clause (Johnson II) or enumerated clause | Petitioners: Mathis shows Maine burglary is non-generic, so enhancement must have relied on residual clause | Government/district courts: Record and prior rulings show enhancements were imposed under enumerated clause | Held: Dimott and Collamore were sentenced under enumerated clause; petitioners did not show reliance on residual clause |
| Burden of proof when record is silent about which ACCA clause was used | Casey: In silence, presume residual-clause reliance; burden should not fall on petitioner | Government: Petitioner bears burden to prove by preponderance that sentencing relied on residual clause | Held: Petitioner bears burden to show it is more likely than not sentence rested solely on residual clause; Casey failed to meet this burden |
| Whether the Government waived timeliness defense by not raising it below (Casey) | Casey: Government forfeited the untimeliness defense by omitting it in district court | Government: Timeliness can be raised on appeal / sua sponte; no strategic waiver shown | Held: Court may consider timeliness sua sponte; Government did not forfeit the defense; timeliness considered and petition denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidating ACCA’s residual clause)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (statutory elements test for generic-offense comparison)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (Johnson II held retroactive on collateral review)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (definition and use of "generic" burglary for ACCA)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (retroactivity principles for new rules on collateral review)
- United States v. Duquette, 778 F.3d 314 (1st Cir. 2015) (held Maine burglary qualified as generic burglary under ACCA prior to Mathis)
- Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. 463 (2012) (appellate courts may in limited circumstances raise timeliness sua sponte)
- Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 2017) (movant must show by preponderance that sentencing relied on residual clause)