Dimitri Shivkov v. Artex Risk Solutions, Inc.
974 F.3d 1051
| 9th Cir. | 2020Background:
- Between 2009–2012 plaintiffs retained Artex and Tribeca to form and manage captive insurance companies; plaintiffs paid premiums and claimed tax deductions for those payments.
- The IRS audited plaintiffs, assessed liabilities/penalties, plaintiffs settled with the IRS, then filed a putative class action alleging the captives were abusive tax shelters and defendants failed to disclose/advice (fraud, RICO, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, etc.).
- The client agreements contained an arbitration clause requiring mediation then binding arbitration in Mesa, Arizona (with AAA as fallback) and some agreements had a limited "survival" provision in a Termination and Withdrawal section.
- The district court granted defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, ordered individual arbitration (denying class arbitration), and dismissed the complaint without prejudice; plaintiffs appealed.
- On appeal the Ninth Circuit considered: enforceability of the arbitration clause (fiduciary/fraud and survival post-termination), scope of arbitrability (including tax/legal-advice claims), whether class arbitration is a court gateway question and whether the clause permits/delegates class arbitration, and whether non‑signatory defendants may compel arbitration.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enforceability based on alleged fiduciary duty/fraud | Plaintiffs: Artex/Tribeca breached a fiduciary duty to point out/explain the arbitration clause so the clause is unenforceable (fraud basis). | Defendants: No Arizona authority creates a fiduciary duty to call out arbitration clauses; FAA/savings clause governs enforceability. | Court: Plaintiffs failed to identify Arizona law imposing such a duty; clause enforceable. |
| Survival of arbitration clause after contract termination | Plaintiffs: Survival clause excludes arbitration so arbitration obligations do not survive termination. | Defendants: Presumption favors post‑termination arbitration unless expressly/clearly negated; clause does not negate presumption. | Court: Applied Litton presumption; survival clause was not comprehensive—arbitration obligations survive. |
| Scope — do non‑contract claims (e.g., tax/legal advice, RICO) fall within clause? | Plaintiffs: Agreements disclaim providing tax/legal advice, so such claims lie outside arbitration scope. | Defendants: Clause covers "any dispute" relating to services/obligations; ambiguities resolved for arbitration. | Court: Clause is broad; any ambiguity resolved in favor of arbitration; all claims encompassed. |
| Class arbitration — who decides availability and is class arbitration permitted? | Plaintiffs: Clause allows arbitration before AAA (and AAA rules delegate class availability to arbitrator); or parties agreed to arbitrate class claims. | Defendants: Whether class arbitration is available is a gateway question for the court; clause is silent and does not clearly delegate or permit class arbitration. | Court: Joined circuits holding class arbitration is presumptive gateway for courts; clause did not clearly and unmistakably delegate the issue; silence means no class arbitration — individual arbitration only. |
| Non‑signatory defendants compelling arbitration (alternative estoppel) | Plaintiffs: Non‑signatories cannot compel arbitration of plaintiffs’ claims. | Defendants: Arizona alternative‑estoppel permits nonsignatories to compel arbitration where claims presuppose or rely on the written agreement. | Court: Plaintiffs’ claims presume and intimately rely on the agreements; all non‑signatory defendants may compel arbitration. |
Key Cases Cited
- Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190 (presumption in favor of post‑expiration arbitration unless expressly/clearly negated)
- Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (distinguishes gateway arbitrability questions for courts from procedural questions for arbitrators)
- Stolt‑Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (class arbitration changes the nature of arbitration; cannot be presumed)
- AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (federal policy favoring arbitration and limits on state defenses)
- Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (silence or ambiguity in agreement is insufficient to allow class arbitration)
- Brennan v. Opus Bank, 796 F.3d 1125 (incorporation of AAA Rules can clearly and unmistakably delegate arbitrability in some contexts)
- Huffman v. Hilltop Cos., LLC, 747 F.3d 391 (analysis of survival clause and post‑termination arbitration presumption)
- Sun Valley Ranch 308 Ltd. P’ship v. Robson, 294 P.3d 125 (Ariz. Ct. App. recognizing alternative estoppel allowing nonsignatory to compel arbitration)
- Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (state law defenses to arbitration agreements are governed by general contract defenses)
