992 F. Supp. 2d 751
E.D. Ky.2014Background
- Dillons sued Medtronic in Pike County Circuit Court for state-law claims including negligence, products liability, and fraud-related theories arising from spine fusion with Infuse.
- Dillons allege Infuse was used off-label contrary to FDA-approved labeling, and Medtronic promoted off-label use.
- Defendants removed to federal court invoking federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
- Medtronic argues federal preemption under the Medical Device Amendments (MDA) preempts state-law claims arising from Infuse.
- Dillons contend these claims are state-law and not navigable under Grable or other federal-question theories.
- Court grants remand, holding no federal question appears on the face of the well-pleaded complaint and no complete preemption or artful pleading exists to support jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether removal is proper under the well-pleaded complaint rule | Dillons argue no federal question appears in the complaint | Medtronic contends preemption embeds a substantial federal question | Remand granted; no federal question on face of complaint |
| Whether Grable-style substantial federal question applies | Grable applies if a substantial federal issue is necessary | Grable governs embedded federal questions in state claims | Not applicable; Grable not satisfied by pleaded facts |
| Whether complete preemption supports federal jurisdiction | Preemption does not itself create jurisdiction | MDA preemption could create federal claim | Not met; complete preemption absent an exclusive federal remedy |
| Whether artful pleading grounds exist to recast claims as federal | No federal claim exists and artful pleading not present | Potential to recast via artful pleading | No jurisdiction via artful pleading |
| Whether any other theory could support federal jurisdiction | State claims premised on federal law do not arise under federal law | Other theories could create jurisdiction | No other basis for jurisdiction; remand affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908) (well-pleaded complaint rule governs federal-question jurisdiction)
- Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005) (embedded federal issue must be substantial and central to claim)
- Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009) (federal jurisdiction cannot be based on defenses or counterclaims not in complaint)
- Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987) (defenses cannot ordinarily establish federal question jurisdiction; complete preemption is limited)
- Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983) (well-pleaded complaint rule and exceptions overview)
- Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921) (Holmes test: suit arises under law that creates the cause of action ( Holmes-type analysis))
- Brunner v. Brunner, 629 F.3d 527 (2011) ( Sixth Circuit on substantial-federal-question doctrine limitations)
- Mikulski v. Centerior Energy Corp., 501 F.3d 555 (2007) (substantial-federal-question doctrine limited to face-of-pleading federal issues)
- Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013) (limits of federal-question jurisdiction; Holmes test relevance)
- Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008) (FDA preemption of state-law claims for medical devices)
