Dillon v. Commonwealth
2015 Ky. LEXIS 1936
| Ky. | 2015Background
- On Feb. 29, 2012, Amy Dennison was found dead in her van from two gunshot wounds; no gun was recovered in the van. Dillon was later found in nearby woods with a .38 pistol and a head wound; officers questioned him at the scene.
- Trooper McPherson gave Miranda warnings and asked Dillon yes/no questions while Dillon, handcuffed, was bleeding from a gunshot wound to the roof of his mouth and had swollen eyes; Dillon nodded or shook answers (e.g., admitted shooting his girlfriend and himself, admitted fighting).
- Forensic evidence (blood spatter, wound locations, single recovered bullet) supported the Commonwealth’s theory of intentional killing; Dillon testified it was accidental/self-defense and presented defense forensic testimony supporting that account.
- At trial a jail cellmate (Saulsberry) testified about overheard conversation(s) involving Dillon and another inmate (McIntosh); the testimony included hearsay and the prosecutor impeached Saulsberry by recounting prior out-of-court statements made to the prosecutor.
- Other contested evidence: testimony from Dennison’s niece that Dennison had disposed of a 9mm because she feared it would be used against her, and testimony that Dennison planned to move to Indiana because she feared Dillon.
- Dillon was convicted of murder and sentenced to 40 years; he appealed raising (1) suppression/Miranda issues, (2) cellmate hearsay and improper prosecutor impeachment, (3) niece’s hearsay about the gun, and (4) hearsay about Dennison’s plan to move.
Issues
| Issue | Dillon's Argument | Commonwealth's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Dillon’s nods/answers at scene (Miranda waiver and voluntariness) | Responses and apparent waiver were involuntary and not a knowing, intelligent waiver due to severe head injury | Trooper’s testimony showed Dillon was coherent, followed commands, understood rights, and answered knowingly | Responses were voluntary but waiver was not proven knowing and intelligent; statements should have been suppressed, but error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt |
| Cellmate (Saulsberry) recounting statements by another inmate (hearsay) | Saulsberry repeated inadmissible hearsay from McIntosh about what Dillon allegedly said | Trial court admonished jury; Commonwealth says error was harmless given weak/he confusing testimony and strong other evidence | Admission of McIntosh’s hearsay through Saulsberry was error but harmless |
| Prosecutor’s impeachment by recounting his own prior conversation with Saulsberry (prosecutor-as-witness) | Prosecutor improperly became a witness by asserting facts outside the record and impeaching with his own unsworn statements | Commonwealth contends impeachment was done in good faith and Saulsberry’s signed statement existed; error was not prejudicial | Method was clear error and unconstitutional practice, but not palpable error here (no manifest injustice) so no reversal |
| Niece’s testimony that Dennison said she got rid of a gun because she feared it would be used against her | That statement was inadmissible hearsay (past fact) not within state-of-mind exception | Commonwealth argued it showed Dennison’s state of mind and fear | Statement was hearsay outside KRE 803(3) and should not have been admitted, but error was harmless |
| Testimony that Dennison planned to move to Indiana out of fear of Dillon | Dillon argued hearsay and irrelevant because no proof he knew or would learn of it | Commonwealth argued it was admissible under state-of-mind exception to show motive/fear and was relevant to self-defense claim | Admissible under state-of-mind exception and relevant; properly admitted |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966) (Miranda warnings and waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent)
- Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (U.S. 1978) (statements by severely injured suspects may be involuntary where police overreach; Court must review voluntariness independently)
- Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (U.S. 1964) (involuntary confessions used at trial violate due process regardless of other evidence)
- Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (U.S. 1967) (hospital statements obtained after coercive police conduct inadmissible)
- Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (U.S. 2010) (burden to show waiver of Miranda by a preponderance; limited understanding of rights relevant)
- Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (U.S. 1986) (waiver inquiry requires voluntariness and full awareness of right and consequences)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (U.S. 1967) (constitutional error may be upheld if harmless beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (U.S. 1993) (harmless-error standard for federal constitutional error)
- Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (U.S. 1946) (harmless-error framework: whether inadmissible evidence had substantial influence)
- Holt v. Commonwealth, 219 S.W.3d 731 (Ky. 2007) (prosecutor may not assert personal knowledge of facts in issue or impeach by unsworn assertion; prosecutor-as-witness error can be constitutional)