Digsby v. McNeil
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 24949
11th Cir.2010Background
- Digsby, a Florida prisoner, was convicted of felon-in-possession of a firearm and sentenced to ten years; he challenged the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition as to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
- At trial, Counts 1 and 3 (aggravated battery and marijuana) were tried together; the firearm charge (Count 2) was severed for a separate trial.
- Eyewitness Swindell and deputy Willey testified to a confrontation where a gun was involved; Digsby claimed self-defense and testified he did not know Willey possessed a weapon at the outset.
- The jury acquitted Digsby of aggravated battery and convicted him on the drug charge; the court later held a separate trial on Count 2, felon-in-possession of a firearm, resulting in a ten-year sentence with a three-year minimum.
- Digsby moved to bar Count 2 on collateral estoppel/double jeopardy grounds, but the Florida trial and appellate courts rejected the claim; the gun conviction stood.
- Digsby filed a federal habeas petition arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for not raising collateral estoppel on direct appeal; the district court denied relief and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether collateral estoppel barred Count 2 from prosecution | Digsby argues the first trial's acquittal on aggravated battery foreclosed the gun charge. | McNeil contends the first trial did not necessarily determine the gun possession issue, so collateral estoppel does not apply. | Collateral estoppel does not bar the gun conviction. |
| Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising collateral estoppel on direct appeal | Digsby contends counsel's failure was deficient and prejudiced by allowing the gun conviction to stand. | McNeil argues there was no reasonable probability the outcome would have been different given no necessary determination of possession in the first trial. | No ineffective assistance; state court denial was reasonable under Strickland and AEDPA. |
| Whether the Strickland standard was properly applied under AEDPA review | Digsby argues de novo review should apply, showing deficient performance and prejudice. | McNeil asserts the standard requires a highly deferential review; the state court’s determination was reasonable. | Review was appropriately deferential; no error shown under AEDPA § 2254(d)(1). |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1970) (establishes collateral estoppel scope and the need for a necessary determination)
- Brown v. United States (First Brown), 983 F.2d 201 (11th Cir. 1993) (collateral estoppel requires a fact necessarily determined in the prior acquittal)
- United States v. Brown, 53 F.3d 312 (11th Cir. 1995) (jury may credit part of testimony and still reach a verdict on other issues)
- Ohayon v. United States, 483 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2007) (standard for applying collateral estoppel in a subsequent prosecution)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-pronged test for ineffective assistance of counsel)