Diego Morales v. John Rust, 228 N.E.3d 1025

Background

John Rust sought the 2024 Republican primary nomination for U.S. Senate in Indiana but failed to meet Indiana Code § 3-8-2-7(a)(4)’s "Affiliation Statute" requirement (prove affiliation by voting in the two most recent primaries in which he voted or by county chair certification).
Rust last voted in a Republican primary in 2016, so he could not satisfy the two-primary voting metric and asked Jackson County Republican Chair Amanda Lowery for certification; she refused.
Rust filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief; the trial court enjoined enforcement of the statute as unconstitutional on multiple grounds.
The State (Secretary of State, Indiana Election Commission, Lowery) appealed directly to the Indiana Supreme Court; this Court stayed the trial-court injunction and ultimately reversed, directing entry of judgment for the State.
The Supreme Court applied Anderson–Burdick balancing to Rust’s First and Fourteenth Amendment associational claim and addressed related vagueness/overbreadth, Seventeenth Amendment, Indiana equal-privileges-and-immunities, and statutory-construction challenges.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Rust)	Defendant's Argument (State/Party)	Held
First Amendment associational challenge to the Affiliation Statute (Anderson–Burdick)	Statute burdens Rust’s rights to associate / to be the party’s nominee; burden is severe as it excludes him from the primary ballot and meaningful party participation.	The statute imposes only a minor, reasonable, nondiscriminatory restriction; state interests (party autonomy, party identifiability, election integrity, preventing overcrowding/raiding) are important and justify the rule.	The Court held the restriction is minor and survives Anderson–Burdick; judgment for State.
Void-for-vagueness and overbreadth	Option B (chair certification) lacks standards and is impermissibly vague/overbroad.	Statute provides two clear alternatives (voting history or chair certification); fits civil, procedural ballot-access context and gives fair notice.	The Court rejected vagueness and overbreadth challenges.
Seventeenth Amendment (argument that statute alters voters’ power to elect senators)	The statute allegedly shifts rights away from voters to the legislature/party chairs and indirectly limits voter choice.	The statute is a procedural regulation of primary ballot access, not a substantive change to constitutional qualifications.	The Court held the statute is a permissible procedural regulation and does not violate the Seventeenth Amendment.
Indiana Constitution – Article 1 § 23 (privileges/immunities), claim that statute treats Rust unequally	Rust argued disparate treatment versus prior-law candidates or versus candidates with more lenient county chairs.	The statute applies equally to all candidates; differences Rust points to are not inherent characteristics or valid comparators.	The Court rejected the state-constitutional equal-protection (privileges/immunities) claim.
Statutory interpretation / discretion of county chair	Lowery’s discretionary certification is arbitrary and unbounded, violating canons of construction.	The statute’s plain text grants county chairs discretion to certify party membership; that discretion protects party associational rights.	The Court upheld the certification option and held the chair’s discretion lawful under the statute.

Key Cases Cited

Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (States have a compelling interest in stability of political systems and may regulate ballot access to prevent chaos)
N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres, 552 U.S. 196 (2008) (political parties have First Amendment right to limit membership and to choose candidate-selection processes; parties can use First Amendment as a shield)
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (balancing test for election-law burdens on associational and voting rights)
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (clarified tiers in Anderson balancing: severe burdens trigger strict scrutiny; reasonable nondiscriminatory burdens may be justified by important regulatory interests)
Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (Anderson–Burdick framework applied; courts should first identify burden severity)
Democratic Party of U.S. v. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981) (party’s right to identify who constitutes the association and to limit membership)
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (freedom of association implicit in First Amendment protections)
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997) (States may enact regulations that favor stability and temper factionalism)
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (distinguishes substantive qualification rules from procedural election regulations under the Elections Clause)
Hero v. Lake County Election Bd., 42 F.4th 768 (7th Cir. 2022) (upheld exclusion from primary ballot where party/board excluded candidate; treated restriction as a minor burden given alternative access to general election ballot)