Dieffenbauch v. Rhinehart Railroad Construction, Inc.
8:17-cv-01180
N.D.N.Y.Feb 3, 2021Background
- Named Plaintiff James Dieffenbauch sued Rhinehart Railroad Construction under the FLSA, alleging the company failed to pay travel time (home↔job and between job sites), reducing overtime pay under 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).
- Court conditionally certified an FLSA collective in August 2018 for hourly "Railroad Workers" in several states; 43 opt-in plaintiffs joined.
- Defendant moved to decertify the collective under the step-two “similarly situated” inquiry; four opt-in plaintiffs were deposed as a representative sample.
- Depositions showed all four opt-ins reported not being paid for at least some travel time and had similar roles as operators/laborers on traveling jobs.
- The Court confronted uncertainty about the proper step-two test after Scott v. Chipotle and therefore applied both Scott’s material-similarity test and the older ad hoc factors.
- Court denied decertification, finding material common issues (existence/effect of travel-pay practices) and that individualized defenses relate mainly to damages and do not defeat collective treatment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiffs are "similarly situated" for collective treatment (step two) | Opt-ins share material common facts and legal issues: unpaid travel time under a common practice; representative depositions support commonality | Practices vary by job and supervisor; individualized inquiries (hours, whether travel was paid) require individual adjudication | Denied decertification; plaintiffs sufficiently similarly situated under either Scott or ad hoc tests |
| Whether Scott v. Chipotle’s standard controls or the ad hoc factors | Scott’s material-similarity focus supports collective treatment; at least one common issue suffices | Argues traditional ad hoc factors show individual differences that preclude collective action | Court applied both tests; found plaintiffs meet either standard and declined to revisit conditional-certification findings |
| Whether individualized defenses (supervisor knowledge, different practices) preclude collective action | Such defenses are common to damage inquiries and do not defeat similarity | These individualized defenses are pervasive and warrant decertification | Rejected as basis for decertification; defenses relate mainly to damages and are for trial resolution |
| Fairness/procedural considerations of collective treatment | Collective action reduces costs, promotes efficient resolution, and is appropriate here | No persuasive fairness argument to decertify given common issues | Collective treatment favored; decertification would be burdensome and inefficient |
Key Cases Cited
- Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537 (2d Cir. 2010) (establishes two-step FLSA collective-action certification framework)
- Scott v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 954 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 2020) (requires material similarity of legal or factual issues among plaintiffs at step two)
- Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (U.S. 1989) (recognizes collective action benefits like pooled resources and lower individual costs)
- Hoffmann v. Sbarro, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (describes modest factual showing for conditional certification)
- Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 715 F. Supp. 2d 378 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (observes FLSA does not define "similarly situated")
- Campbell v. City of Los Angeles, 903 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2018) (discussion of what it means to be similarly situated for collective actions)
- Shabazz v. Morgan Funding Corp., 269 F.R.D. 245 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (positions need be similar, not identical, for collective treatment)
- McGlone v. Contract Callers, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 3d 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (denying decertification where collective treatment promoted efficiency)