Diedra T. v. Justina R.
313 Neb. 417
| Neb. | 2023Background
- Diedra (petitioner) and Justina were formerly sexually involved; Diedra ended contact and alleged Justina became obsessive and threatening.
- On March 30, 2022, Diedra filed for a domestic abuse protection order; the court entered an ex parte harassment protection order the same day covering Diedra and her two minor children.
- Diedra alleged Justina sent numerous texts/calls (from various numbers to evade blocking), threatened to reveal Diedra’s sexual relationship to her employer, and threatened suicide if the relationship ended; Justina allegedly refused to leave Diedra’s home on March 29 until police intervened.
- At the May 5, 2022 show-cause hearing the court considered both continuation of the ex parte harassment order and whether a domestic abuse order was appropriate; Diedra asked the court to treat the petition as a domestic abuse request but also to continue the harassment order.
- The district court found sufficient evidence to continue the harassment protection order as to Diedra but insufficient evidence to grant a domestic abuse order; it continued the harassment order for 1 year and included the children.
- On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed as modified: it upheld the harassment order as to Diedra but removed the children from its scope for lack of evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Diedra's Argument | Justina's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence supported continuing harassment order as to Diedra | Threats (to out her to employer, threaten suicide), repeated contacts, and police intervention show a knowing course of conduct that seriously threatens/intimidates | Volume of texts/calls alone is insufficient; no physical threats or harm to Diedra or children | Affirmed as to Diedra: objective reasonable-person standard met given threats to disclose and persistent contacts intended to evade blocking |
| Whether evidence supported continuing harassment order as to the children | Children are covered because petitioner reasonably feared for their safety as a result of threats to the parent | No specific acts or threats toward children; Justina had close relationship and denied harming them | Reversed as to children: record lacks specific evidence that a reasonable person would be seriously terrified, threatened, or intimidated on children’s behalf |
| Whether continuing harassment order after petitioner renewed request for domestic abuse order violated Justina's due process rights | No due process violation because respondent had notice and opportunity to be heard on harassment theory; domestic-abuse request was considered as an alternative | Yerania O. suggests courts may not sua sponte switch theories; Justina claims she lacked notice that harassment order remained possible after domestic-abuse theory was raised | Denied: court provided statutorily required notice, treated both theories simultaneously, and gave parties chance to present evidence, so no due process violation |
| Mootness if order expires before appellate decision | Public-interest exception and collateral consequences argue against mootness | Appeal not moot while order remains in effect | Court declined to address mootness because the order had not yet expired |
Key Cases Cited
- Garrison v. Otto, 311 Neb. 94 (2022) (protection order review is de novo but trial judge’s credibility findings can be given weight when evidence conflicts)
- Hawkins v. Delgado, 308 Neb. 301 (2021) (show-cause hearing burden: petitioner must prove facts by preponderance; protection order analogous to injunction)
- Maria A. on behalf of Leslie G. v. Oscar G., 301 Neb. 673 (2018) (petitioner’s burden at show cause and subsequent burden shift to respondent)
- In re Interest of Jeffrey K., 273 Neb. 239 (2007) (harassment standard assessed objectively—what a reasonable person would experience)
- Richards v. McClure, 290 Neb. 124 (2015) (statutory harassment language includes nonphysical threats and intimidation)
- Robert M. on behalf of Bella O. v. Danielle O., 303 Neb. 268 (2019) (under domestic abuse act, third-party family members may be protected when target reasonably fears for their safety)
- Yerania O. v. Juan P., 310 Neb. 749 (2022) (due process in protection hearings requires notice of the ultimate theory and a fair opportunity to address it)
- R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (First Amendment precedent on unprotected categories of speech referenced in discussion of threats)
- U.S. v. Hobgood, 868 F.3d 744 (8th Cir. 2017) (statements threatening disclosure have been treated as extortionate/unprotected in related contexts)
- Altafulla v. Ervin, 238 Cal. App. 4th 571 (2015) (use of true information to cause severe emotional distress can constitute abuse)
