Diean Sabin v. Ivan Ackerman
2014 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 31
| Iowa | 2014Background
- Elmer Gaede died testate, leaving farmland and other assets to three beneficiaries including Diean Sabin as executor; Alberta predeceased him.
- Diean named Ackerman, an attorney, as the attorney in the probate report; no other written attorney–client documentation existed between Diean and Ackerman.
- James and Marlys Gaede exercised the lease option to purchase the farm during probate, and the beneficiaries conveyed the farm to them; Ackerman prepared and notarized the deed documents.
- The option sale proceeded without Ackerman advising Diean of potential challenges or advising independent counsel for her personal interests.
- The estate closed after the conveyance, and Diean later sued Ackerman for legal malpractice alleging failure to protect her personal interests related to the option.
- Ackerman moved for summary judgment, arguing he owed no duty to protect Diean’s personal interests as estate attorney; the district court granted summary judgment for Ackerman.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether estate attorneys owe a duty to protect personal interests | Diean argues estate attorney represents executor and personal interests unless limited. | Ackerman argues no such personal-interests duty; representation is limited to estate administration. | No independent personal-interests duty; only estate-administration duties owed. |
| Whether Diean’s subjective expectation created a duty for Ackerman | Diean asserts she reasonably relied on Ackerman to protect her personal interests. | Ackerman contends subjective expectation is insufficient without reasonable alerting facts. | Insufficient facts to show reasonable alert or reliance; no duty created. |
| Whether the scope-limitation rule creates a broader duty for estate attorneys | Rule allowing limitation of representation could imply broader duties to protect personal interests. | Limitation rule only applies when an agreement to limit exists; it does not impose a broad personal-interests duty. | Declines to adopt broader personal-interests duty; limit-scope rule does not create new duty. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ruden v. Jenk, 543 N.W.2d 605 (Iowa 1997) (estate attorney duties extend to proper administration; potential third-party issues discussed)
- Schmitz v. Crotty, 528 N.W.2d 112 (Iowa 1995) (liability arises when testator’s intent is frustrated and beneficiaries harmed)
- Trobaugh v. Sondag, 668 N.W.2d 577 (Iowa 2003) (elements of legal malpractice; duty, breach, causation require attorney-client relationship to the act)
- Wunschel v. Comm’n on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct, 461 N.W.2d 840 (Iowa 1990) (recognizes that an attorney represents a client only on matters engaged to discharge)
- St. Malachy Roman Catholic Congregation of Geneseo v. Ingram, 841 N.W.2d 338 (Iowa 2013) (duty to protect the testator’s intent and beneficiaries’ interests when administering estate)
- Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa 1987) (liability when testator’s intent is thwarted and beneficiary's interest affected)
- Estate of Leonard v. Swift, 656 N.W.2d 132 (Iowa 2003) (third-party beneficiary considerations in estate planning)
- In re Estate of Scheeler, 226 Iowa 650 (1939) (estate-proceeds and administration considerations in prior precedent)