345 P.3d 43
Wash. Ct. App.2015Background
- Five drivers (Didlake and four others) were arrested for DUI; the Department of Licensing (DOL) initiated administrative license suspension proceedings under Washington’s implied consent statute.
- The statute required payment of a mandatory fee to obtain an administrative review hearing; DOL could waive the fee for indigent drivers.
- Four plaintiffs paid the fee, prevailed at their hearings, and had suspensions rescinded; one plaintiff paid twice for hearings arising from separate arrests.
- Didlake filed a class action seeking declaratory/injunctive relief and refunds/damages, alleging the fee violated procedural due process.
- The trial court granted the Department’s CR 12(b)(6) motion (treated as summary judgment because the court considered declarations), dismissing the complaint; the dismissal was affirmed on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the statutory fee for an administrative DUI hearing violates procedural due process (facial challenge) | The fee denies meaningful access to a process to protect a property interest (driver’s license) and therefore is unconstitutional in all applications | Driving is not a fundamental right; statute provides indigent waiver; fee is constitutionally permissible for non-fundamental interests | Fee is constitutional on its face because driving is not a fundamental right and an indigent waiver exists |
| Whether the fee violated plaintiff’s due process rights as applied to Didlake | Fee chilled access and therefore deprived him of due process | Didlake paid the fee, received notice and a meaningful hearing complying with due process | As applied, no violation: Didlake obtained a hearing and procedural protections |
| Proper standard of review for dismissal | Not contested beyond noting the posture | Court treated the CR 12 motion as summary judgment because matters outside pleadings were considered | De novo review under CR 56; dismissal affirmed because no material fact disputes and plaintiff cannot prevail as a matter of law |
| Whether Mathews balancing requires fee waiver or free initial hearing | Plaintiff argued due process requires an initial free hearing | Defendant argued waiver for indigents satisfies due process; driving is non-fundamental so fee can be imposed | Court declined further Mathews balancing because interest is not fundamental and indigent waiver addresses access concerns |
Key Cases Cited
- Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (states may not deny indigent litigants access to divorce proceedings solely for inability to pay)
- United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (refusing to extend Boddie to non-fundamental interests such as bankruptcy)
- Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (upholding filing fees where interest is not fundamental and fees are rationally related to governmental cost-offset)
- M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (reaffirming that fee waivers are required when fundamental parental rights are at stake)
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (articulating the three-factor balancing test for procedural due process)
- Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (recognizing driver’s license as a property interest entitled to due process)
- Morrison v. Department of Labor & Industries, 168 Wn. App. 269 (2012) (holding filing fees constitutional where only monetary interests at stake)
- Downey v. Pierce County, 165 Wn. App. 152 (2011) (struck down fees for initial review of dangerous animal declarations where interest was more than purely economic)