Dickson v. United States, 11 F.4th 308

Background

Plaintiff Bryan Kerr Dickson, incarcerated at USP Beaumont, alleges BOP transferred and housed him in general population despite expressing fear of violence due to child‑pornography convictions; he was subsequently assaulted.
After the assault he was placed in the SHU, where he alleges numerous harms: denial of mental‑health care, denial of law library and grievance access, destruction of legal papers, staff‑encouraged suicide, food poisoning, sexual disparagement, prolonged nudity, and a later assault in front of staff.
Dickson attempted suicide while in SHU and later filed an FTCA suit (negligence and intentional torts) seeking damages and other relief; he disavowed any Bivens constitutional claims.
The district court dismissed all claims for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction: negligence claims under the FTCA discretionary‑function exception; intentional tort claims under the FTCA intentional‑tort exception because it held the law‑enforcement proviso did not apply.
On appeal the Fifth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the negligence claims (finding prison classification and treatment decisions discretionary) but reversed dismissal of the intentional tort claims in light of Millbrook, remanding to decide whether the alleged torts were committed within the officers’ scope of employment.
The court also held Dickson’s IIED claim need not be jurisdictionally barred as derivative of excepted torts because some alleged conduct is independent of assault/false‑imprisonment.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether FTCA discretionary‑function exception bars negligence claims arising from prisoner placement and care	Dickson: BOP negligently transferred/placed him and denied treatment despite known risk	Government: Prisoner classification, transfers, and related care decisions are discretionary policy decisions	Held: Affirmed — discretionary‑function exception applies; Dickson alleged no violation of a nondiscretionary duty
Whether the law‑enforcement proviso waives immunity for Dickson’s intentional‑tort claims	Dickson: BOP officers are law‑enforcement officers and their tortious acts fall under the proviso	Government/district court: Officers were not acting in law‑enforcement/investigative capacities, so proviso doesn’t apply	Held: Reversed and remanded — Millbrook controls; proviso applies based on officers’ status and whether acts were within scope of employment; remand to decide scope
Whether Dickson’s IIED claim is jurisdictionally barred as arising out of excepted torts	Dickson: IIED arises from independent conduct (e.g., encouraged suicide, disparaging remarks)	Government: IIED is derivative of assault/false imprisonment and thus barred	Held: The court rejects the district court’s derivative‑bar ruling; IIED may survive because some alleged conduct is independent

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991) (establishes two‑part test for discretionary‑function exception).
Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988) (discretionary‑function exception protects policy‑based governmental decisions).
Millbrook v. United States, 569 U.S. 50 (2013) (law‑enforcement proviso applies to acts or omissions of law‑enforcement officers within scope of employment, irrespective of investigatory activity).
Spotts v. United States, 613 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2010) (standard of review and discussion of FTCA waiver/exceptions).
St. Tammany Parish ex rel. Davis v. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 556 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. 2009) (plaintiff must plead facts facially outside discretionary‑function exception).
Cohen v. United States, 151 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 1998) (BOP prisoner classification and transfer decisions fall within discretionary function).
Truman v. United States, 26 F.3d 592 (5th Cir. 1994) (IIED not among FTCA’s six excepted intentional torts).
McNeily v. United States, 6 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1993) (non‑excepted torts can be barred if they ‘‘arise out of’’ excepted conduct).