Dickinson v. Suntrust National Mortgage Inc.
2014 Ark. 513
Ark.2014Background
- Certified question from the Eastern District of Arkansas concerns whether Fannie Mae may foreclose under the Statutory Foreclosure Act without an Arkansas certificate of authority.
- Dickinsons allege Fannie Mae is not authorized to do business in Arkansas because it has not registered in the state.
- SunTrust initiated foreclosure under Ark. Code Ann. § 18-50-101 et seq.; Dickinsons sued in state court, then case removed to federal court.
- Eighth Circuit in JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. v. Johnson held federal authorization to do business may satisfy § 18-50-117.
- Arkansas appellate court must interpret § 18-50-117 and determine if federal charter suffices; statute ambiguous and interpreted in light of legislative intent.
- Court ultimately holds that Fannie Mae’s federal charter authorizes it to do business and satisfies § 18-50-117.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does § 18-50-117 require state registration to authorize foreclosure? | Dickinsons: authorization must be state registration. | Fannie Mae: federal authorization suffices. | Statute ambiguous; federal authorization sufficient. |
| Does Fannie Mae’s federal charter authorize it to do business in Arkansas for SFA purposes? | Dickinsons: charter does not imply Arkansas-branch authorization. | Fannie Mae: charter permits dealing in mortgages nationwide and business without state qualification, satisfying § 18-50-117. | Fannie Mae’s federal charter satisfies authorized-to-do-business under § 18-50-117. |
Key Cases Cited
- JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Johnson, 719 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 2013) (federal authorization can satisfy authorized-to-do-business for SFA)
- Henson v. Fleet Mortgage Co., 319 Ark. 491, 892 S.W.2d 250 (1995) (SFA strict construction; derogation of common law)
- Voltage Vehicles v. Ark. Motor Vehicle Comm’n, 2012 Ark. 386, 424 S.W.3d 281 (Ark. 2012) (statutory ambiguity assessing legislative intent)
- Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Richard's Honda Yamaha, 344 Ark. 44, 38 S.W.3d 356 (2001) (statutory interpretation framework and ambiguity)
- Cousins v. Dennis, 298 Ark. 310, 767 S.W.2d 296 (1989) (presumption regarding legislative intent in statutory construction)