Dickey v. State
2016 Ark. 66
Ark.2016Background
- In July 2010 a house shared by Donald D. Dickey and his estranged wife Mary burned; Mary’s body was found in the burned remains and the fire’s cause could not be determined.
- Dickey was charged with first-degree murder and arson; the State presented evidence placing him at the scene that day, video of him buying gasoline, witnesses who saw him driving away while smoke was visible, and physical evidence (gasoline on his clothing and Mary’s blood on a sock).
- The State introduced testimony that Mary had told acquaintances she was afraid of Dickey and that he had physically abused her; the trial court denied Dickey’s motion in limine and admitted that testimony.
- Dickey moved for directed verdict at the close of the State’s case and again after he rested; both motions were denied. He did not renew a directed-verdict motion after the State’s rebuttal.
- The jury convicted Dickey of first-degree murder and arson and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Dickey appealed, arguing (1) insufficiency of evidence (including that arson was supported only by circumstantial evidence) and (2) erroneous admission of Mary’s out-of-court statements.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence / directed verdict | State: evidence (video, gasoline on clothing, blood, witness sightings, inconsistent statements) supports convictions | Dickey: evidence insufficient; arson proved only by circumstantial evidence | Not reviewed on merits — Dickey waived the issue by failing to renew directed-verdict motion after State rebuttal |
| Admission of victim’s out-of-court statements (hearsay) | State: statements of the victim’s then-existing fear are admissible under the state-of-mind exception | Dickey: testimony about Mary’s fear and prior abuse was inadmissible hearsay and irrelevant to arson intent | Admissible under Ark. R. Evid. 803(3); trial court did not abuse discretion |
| Confrontation Clause challenge | State: victim’s statements to friends were nontestimonial and thus not subject to Confrontation Clause | Dickey: admission deprived him of right to confront declarant | Held nontestimonial (primary purpose was not to create evidence for prosecution); no Confrontation Clause violation |
Key Cases Cited
- Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (nontestimonial/vs testimonial primary-purpose framework for Confrontation Clause)
- MacKool v. State, 365 Ark. 416, 231 S.W.3d 676 (2006) (victim’s statement of fear falls within Rule 803(3) state-of-mind exception)
- Seely v. State, 373 Ark. 141, 282 S.W.3d 778 (2008) (discussing modified primary-purpose test outside police-interrogation context)
- King v. State, 338 Ark. 591, 999 S.W.2d 183 (1999) (renewal requirement for directed-verdict motions; failure to renew waives sufficiency challenge)
- Cathey v. State, 351 Ark. 464, 95 S.W.3d 753 (2003) (renewal of directed-verdict motion is substantive, not mere form)
- Davis v. State, 2009 Ark. 478, 348 S.W.3d 553 (reinforcing preservation rules for directed-verdict sufficiency challenges)