Dickens v. Hudson Sheraton Corp., 689 F. App'x 670

Plaintiff Ernest Dickens, a former employee, appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing his claims for discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, ADEA, and § 1981; on appeal he challenged only the retaliation claims.
Dickens alleges he participated in a union-sponsored November 2013 meeting where he opposed perceived ongoing discrimination and that manager Tom Mituzas reacted with intimidation and threats.
Dickens contends that after the meeting he was denied bartending shifts, which he says was retaliatory.
The district court granted summary judgment for defendants; the Second Circuit reviews that ruling de novo and views the record in the light most favorable to Dickens.
The court framed the retaliation prima facie elements (protected activity, employer knowledge, adverse employment action, causal link) and analyzed whether Mituzas’s outburst or denial of shifts qualified as materially adverse.
The Second Circuit affirmed, finding no materially adverse action and insufficient causal connection between the meeting and later shift denials.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether participation in the November 2013 union meeting was protected activity that led to retaliation	Dickens says he opposed ongoing discrimination at the meeting, a protected activity under Title VII	Defendants concede meeting occurred but dispute that subsequent conduct was materially adverse or causally connected	Participation was protected but related conduct did not produce a materially adverse employment action; claim fails
Whether Mituzas’s alleged intimidation at the meeting was an adverse employment action	Dickens contends Mituzas’s outburst was intimidating and dissuasive	Defendants argue the outburst did not affect employment terms or deter a reasonable worker from complaining	Not adverse: outburst did not concern employment status or reach Burlington-level dissuasion
Whether denial of bartending shifts constituted an adverse employment action causally linked to the meeting	Dickens alleges he was later denied shifts as retaliation	Defendants say no connection shown between meeting and shift denials	No causal link shown; temporal proximity insufficient and no evidence to draw inference
Whether summary judgment was proper on Dickens’s retaliation claim	Dickens contends factual disputes preclude summary judgment	Defendants argue record lacks evidence of materially adverse action and causation	Summary judgment affirmed: no genuine dispute of material fact on adverse action or causation

Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd., 22 F.3d 1219 (2d Cir. 1994) (standard of review for summary judgment)
Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2015) (elements of retaliation prima facie case)
Galabya v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 202 F.3d 636 (2d Cir. 2000) (definition of materially adverse change)
Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2015) (examples of materially adverse employment actions)
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (retaliation actionable where employer conduct would dissuade a reasonable worker)
Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834 (2d Cir. 2013) (temporal proximity standard for inferring causation)