469 F.Supp.3d 1243
N.D. Ala.2020Background
- Denise DiBenedetto owned an insured vehicle that her son, Andrew, was driving on November 4, 2015. Andrew drove aggressively, exited the vehicle, assaulted John Powell, and snapped his glasses. Andrew later pleaded guilty to harassment and criminal mischief.
- Powell filed a civil suit against Andrew and Denise asserting assault, battery, conversion, wantonness, outrage, conspiracy, and a negligent entrustment claim against Denise. The state-court case later settled.
- Allstate initially defended Denise under a reservation of rights, citing an intentional/criminal-acts exclusion in the policy that bars coverage for damages resulting from intentional or criminal acts of any insured.
- After Andrew’s guilty plea, Allstate denied coverage and defense, invoking the exclusion; Denise sued Allstate for breach of contract and bad faith. Denise later conceded the bad-faith claim.
- Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed. The district court held that the policy’s intentional/criminal-acts exclusion precluded coverage for the negligent entrustment claim and that the underlying conduct was not a covered “accident” or “use” of the vehicle, granting summary judgment to Allstate on all claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Duty to defend/indemnify Denise on negligent entrustment claim | Negligent entrustment "arises out of" permitting use of the vehicle and is covered by the policy's coverage for damages arising out of ownership/use of an insured auto | The intentional/criminal-acts exclusion bars coverage for claims that result from an insured's intentional/criminal acts—even if the claim against a co-insured is framed as negligence | Court: Exclusion applies; Allstate owes no duty to defend or indemnify on negligent entrustment claim |
| Whether underlying conduct was an "accident" or "use" triggering coverage | The policy covers damages "arising out of" use of an insured auto; plaintiff relies on that coverage language | Andrew’s intentional acts after exiting the vehicle were independent, intentional criminal acts that break causal chain and are not an insured "use" or an "accident" under the policy | Court: Conduct was intentional, not an "accident" or covered "use"; no coverage |
| Bad-faith claim | Allstate acted in bad faith by denying defense/coverage | Allstate had an arguable basis (reservation then denial based on exclusion) | Plaintiff conceded bad-faith claim; Court entered judgment for Allstate |
| Burden of proof on coverage/exclusion | Plaintiff bears burden to show coverage exists | Insurer bears burden to prove exclusion applies | Court: Allstate met its burden to show exclusion; Denise failed to prove coverage |
Key Cases Cited
- 901 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2018) (summary-judgment standard on cross-motions)
- 922 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1991) (insured bears burden to prove coverage; insurer must prove exclusions)
- 103 So. 3d 795 (Ala. 2012) (policy exclusions construed narrowly but enforced as written)
- 675 So. 2d 377 (Ala. 1996) (intentional acts after exiting vehicle are not "use" of auto and break causal chain)
- 579 So. 2d 585 (Ala. 1990) (independent criminal acts do not arise from use of automobile)
- 874 So. 2d 1058 (Ala. 2003) (distinguishing policies that insure "occurrences" or "accidents")
- 893 So. 2d 1124 (Ala. 2004) (definition of "accident" as unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence)
- 928 So. 2d 1006 (Ala. 2005) (allegations in complaint control duty-to-defend analysis)
