435 P.3d 457
Ariz.2019Background
- Alexis Diaz was arrested for DUI in Tucson; after being read the statutory "admin per se" admonition she "expressly agreed" and submitted to a breath test showing an illegal alcohol concentration.
- Diaz moved to suppress the breath-test result, arguing her statutory and constitutional consent was involuntary; the municipal court granted suppression.
- The superior court affirmed the involuntariness finding but applied the good-faith exception and reversed suppression.
- The court of appeals held § 28-1321 requires a "voluntary" agreement to testing and found Diaz’s agreement voluntary, so the results were admissible; Diaz petitioned for review and the State cross-petitioned.
- The Arizona Supreme Court granted review to decide whether Arizona’s implied-consent statute (§ 28-1321) requires voluntary consent separate from Fourth Amendment analysis.
Issues
| Issue | Diaz's Argument | State/Tucson Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 28-1321 requires that an arrestee’s express agreement to testing be voluntary (Fourth Amendment–style voluntariness) | § 28-1321’s "expressly agree" language implies a voluntariness requirement; prior cases (e.g., Butler) support voluntariness | The statute requires only an "express" agreement (words or conduct); voluntariness is a separate Fourth Amendment inquiry and is not required by the statute | The statute does not require voluntariness; "expressly agree" means unequivocal assent but not a constitutional-style voluntariness showing |
| Whether constitutional (Fourth Amendment) voluntariness is implicated for breath tests under current law | Diaz argued her consent was involuntary under the Fourth Amendment | State relied on Birchfield/Navarro that warrantless breath tests incident to arrest are permissible and do not require consent voluntariness | Court held constitutional issues not implicated here: Birchfield allows warrantless breath tests incident to arrest without showing voluntary consent |
| Whether Carrillo, Butler, Valenzuela II, or Hays compel a statutory voluntariness requirement | Diaz relied on Carrillo/Butler to read voluntariness into the statute | State argued those cases either addressed different issues (constitutional or prior statutory schemes) and do not impose statutory voluntariness | Court distinguished those cases: Carrillo interprets "expressly agree" but does not equate it to voluntariness; Butler and Valenzuela II address Fourth Amendment voluntariness for blood draws, not a statutory requirement for breath tests |
| Whether district court’s or court of appeals’ voluntariness findings/control admissibility here | Diaz challenged appellate voluntariness finding and suppression rulings | State maintained statutory compliance, and that any errors implicated only administrative consequences | Court declined to resolve voluntariness factfinding or good-faith exception issues; instead held statutory voluntariness not required and remanded for proceedings consistent with that holding |
Key Cases Cited
- Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016) (Supreme Court: warrantless breath tests incident to arrest are permissible; breath tests more intrusive standards differ from blood)
- Carrillo v. Houser, 224 Ariz. 463 (2010) (Arizona Supreme Court: § 28-1321 requires an arrestee to "expressly agree" to testing — assent by words or conduct)
- State v. Butler, 232 Ariz. 84 (2013) (Arizona Supreme Court: under the Fourth Amendment, voluntary consent is required for warrantless blood draws)
- State v. Valenzuela, 239 Ariz. 299 (2016) (Arizona Supreme Court: constitutional voluntariness is analyzed under the totality of circumstances; addressed search-incident-to-arrest and consent issues)
- State v. Superior Court (Hays II), 155 Ariz. 408 (1987) (Arizona Supreme Court: prior implied-consent statutory scheme did not entitle defendant to a voluntariness hearing; evidence bearing on refusal affects weight not admissibility)