632 S.W.3d 889
Tex. Crim. App.2021Background
- On Sept. 26, 2013, two men kicked in the home of HPD Officer Troy Dupuy; Dupuy and one intruder (later identified as Nelson Garcia Diaz) exchanged gunfire and Dupuy was shot in the leg.
- Crime-scene items (including sunglasses) were recovered; later DNA testing could not exclude Diaz as the source of DNA on the sunglasses.
- Diaz was arrested four days later in possession of three cell phones; in 2017 a DA investigator obtained a warrant to search those phones based on an affidavit that relied on information from HCSO Sgt. David Angstadt.
- The affidavit said Angstadt received an anonymous tip identifying “Jessie” and two phone numbers, asked the DEA to run the numbers, and learned one number belonged to Diaz; at the suppression hearing testimony showed the source was a DEA confidential informant (CI) and DEA agents ran the numbers on their own initiative and then told Angstadt.
- Diaz moved to suppress the phone-search evidence under Franks v. Delaware, arguing the affidavit materially mischaracterized the CI and who initiated the DEA phone-query; the trial court denied suppression and the court of appeals affirmed.
- The Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to decide whether the alleged misstatements/omissions in the affidavit were material under Franks; it held the disputed statements were not material (and one was not shown false) and affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Diaz's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether describing the source as an "anonymous tip" rather than a DEA CI was a material misrepresentation under Franks | The affidavit omitted that the source was a CI, which matters because CIs lack presumptive reliability | Whether labeled anonymous or CI, reliability is judged by corroboration shown within the affidavit | Not material — the affidavit contained corroboration (DNA link to sunglasses), so the omission did not affect probable cause |
| Whether wording implied Angstadt initiated DEA assistance (B) when DEA did so | The sentence about Angstadt’s training created the impression he contacted DEA based on that experience | No evidence that the sentence was false; Diaz failed to prove falsity as required by Franks | Not proven false; cannot support a Franks challenge |
| Whether the affirmative statement that Angstadt asked DEA to run numbers (C) was material when DEA initiated the check | The affidavit falsely claimed Angstadt requested the DEA phone check | The identity of who prompted the check is immaterial to probable cause if the resulting information is reliable | Immaterial — who initiated the check was unnecessary to the probable-cause finding; removal of that statement leaves adequate probable cause |
Key Cases Cited
- Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (standard for challenging truthfulness of affidavit statements and materiality test)
- Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (probable cause assessed under totality-of-the-circumstances and commonsense review of affidavits)
- State v. Duarte, 389 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (treatment of informant reliability and corroboration in affidavits)
- Hyland v. State, 574 S.W.3d 904 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (reviewing a warrant after excising tainted information)
- State v. Le, 463 S.W.3d 872 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (commonsensical reading of affidavits and reasonable inferences)
- Cates v. State, 120 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (use of suppression-hearing testimony limited to assessing whether affidavit contained material misrepresentations)