Diaz-Baez v. Alicea-Vasallo, 22 F.4th 11

The Automobile Accident Compensation Administration (AACA) is a Puerto Rico public instrumentality that ran large deficits; in 2009 the Board considered cost-cutting measures and adopted a seniority-based Layoff Plan with a June 30, 2009 cut-off (employees with <9 years by that date were subject to layoff).
Julio Alicea‑Vasallo was appointed Executive Director in 2009; the Board passed resolutions approving the Layoff Plan and amending Personnel Regulations to make seniority the primary criterion.
Layoffs announced Nov 2009–Jan 2010 and became effective March 19, 2010; the agency’s subsequent financial statements showed major reductions in losses and deficits.
Sixty‑two career employees (plaintiffs, many alleging PDP affiliation) sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming political discrimination, arguing Alicea‑Vasallo set the cut‑off to target PDP hires and thus personally made the adverse decisions.
Parallel administrative and Puerto Rico court proceedings produced a final Circuit Court decision in Humberto Muler holding the Board (not the Executive Director) made the Layoff Plan, and the Puerto Rico Supreme Court in Rodríguez‑Ocasio held administrative judges lacked jurisdiction to review the Board’s action.
The district court, applying issue preclusion and judicial estoppel based on the Puerto Rico rulings and plaintiffs’ prior positions, entered summary judgment for AACA and Alicea‑Vasallo; the First Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Who made the layoff decision (Board vs Executive Director)?	Alicea made/controlled the Layoff Plan and thus is liable for discriminatory firings.	The Board approved the Layoff Plan; ultimate responsibility rests with the Board.	The Board, not Alicea, approved the Plan; plaintiffs barred from relitigating that issue.
Whether plaintiffs are precluded by prior Puerto Rico decision (issue preclusion)?	Preclusion not applicable; different parties/claims here.	Humberto Muler adjudicated who approved the Plan; issue preclusion binds plaintiffs who were parties.	Twenty‑seven plaintiffs who were in Humberto Muler are issue‑precluded from relitigating who approved the Plan.
Whether remaining plaintiffs are barred by judicial estoppel?	Prior statements conceding Board responsibility should not estop them here.	Plaintiffs previously argued the Board approved the Plan in state proceedings; they are estopped from taking inconsistent positions.	District court did not abuse discretion: judicial estoppel applies to the 16 plaintiffs who took the contrary prior position.
Whether § 1983 political‑discrimination claims survive summary judgment?	The claims present disputed motive and are for trial.	Because plaintiffs cannot establish Alicea made the adverse decision (and are precluded/estopped), claims fail as a matter of law.	Summary judgment for AACA and Alicea‑Vasallo affirmed; no viable § 1983 claims remain.

Bonilla v. Nazario, 843 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1988) (describing AACA’s statutory purpose and separate identity)
Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (U.S. 1982) (‘‘full and fair opportunity to litigate’’ standard relevant to preclusion)
Baez‑Cruz v. Municipality of Comerio, 140 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 1998) (Puerto Rico mutuality requirement and issue‑preclusion principles)
Cruz Berríos v. Gonzalez‑Rosario, 630 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2010) (issue preclusion forecloses relitigation of facts essential to prior judgment)
Alt. Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., 374 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2004) (articulating elements of judicial estoppel)
Bossé v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 992 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2021) (judicial estoppel prevents pressing positions inconsistent with prior legal proceedings)
Pac. Indem. Co. v. Deming, 828 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2016) (standard of review for summary judgment)
Zannino v. United States, 895 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990) (issues not developed on appeal are waived)