808 F.3d 1169
7th Cir.2015Background
- In 2006 twelve U.S. Marshals arrested Dianne Khan in her apartment for making false statements to HUD; she was convicted and given probation later that year.
- Khan alleges humiliating and invasive treatment during the arrest (pat-down, exposure to a male agent while using the bathroom, refusal to cover her head, and inadvertent touching of her breasts).
- She wrote to the Marshals Service Office of Inspection in June 2006 describing the treatment but did not request monetary damages; she received initial acknowledgement and later (through a Senator) learned the Service found no misconduct and closed the matter.
- Khan sent an SF-95 administrative tort claim in September 2013 requesting $4 million; the Marshals Service rejected it as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).
- Khan filed suit in 2014 against the United States (FTCA) and the marshals (Bivens). The district court dismissed as time-barred; the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Khan’s June 2006 letter satisfied FTCA presentment requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) and § 2401(b) | The June 2006 letter was an administrative claim presented within two years of accrual | The letter did not demand money in a sum certain (or any sum), so it was not a proper administrative claim | Held: June 2006 letter was not a valid FTCA claim because it lacked a demand for money; it therefore did not satisfy § 2401(b) presentment requirement |
| Whether Khan sued within six months of final denial under § 2401(b) | The agency’s later (2013) denial was the definitive denial, so suit was within six months | Even if 2009 communication was a denial, Khan did not sue within six months; but treating 2013 letter as denial still fails because of earlier presentment defect | Held: Court assumes 2013 denial could be definitive but suit still untimely because initial presentment was invalid under § 2401(b) |
| Whether § 2401(a) six-year limitations period applies instead of § 2401(b) | § 2401(a) six-year bar should govern accrual from agency denial and make suit timely | FTCA tort claims are governed by § 2401(b) (specific to tort claims) | Held: § 2401(b) governs FTCA tort claims; § 2401(a) inapplicable here |
| Timeliness of Bivens claims against individual marshals (statute of limitations) | (Implicit) Bivens claim timely under federal law standards | Wisconsin six-year statute applies; claim accrued in 2006 so 2014 filing is too late | Held: Bivens claims are governed by Wisconsin six-year limitations and accrued in 2006; claims are time-barred |
Key Cases Cited
- Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (established Bivens actions for constitutional violations by federal agents)
- Cancer Foundation, Inc. v. Cerberus Capital Mgmt., LP, 559 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 2009) (district court may dismiss when complaint admits elements of affirmative defense)
- Kanar v. United States, 118 F.3d 527 (7th Cir. 1997) (SF-95 sum-certain rule is flexible; facts plus demand for money suffice)
- Murrey v. United States, 73 F.3d 1448 (7th Cir. 1996) (administrative claim must include facts plus demand for money to encompass related causes of action)
- Smoke Shop, LLC v. United States, 761 F.3d 779 (7th Cir. 2014) (failure to request any damages is fatal to administrative presentment)
- United States v. Glenn, 231 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1956) (FTCA tort claims governed by § 2401(b) rather than general § 2401(a))
- Pittman v. United States, 341 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1965) (followed Glenn on FTCA timing)
- Schuler v. United States, 628 F.2d 199 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (same)
- Conn v. United States, 867 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1989) (same)
- Reget v. City of La Crosse, 595 F.3d 691 (7th Cir. 2010) (state statute of limitations governs Bivens claims)
- Malone v. Corrections Corp. of America, 553 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 2009) (state limitations and accrual rules apply to federal civil rights/tort claims)
- Leavell v. Kieffer, 189 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 1999) (accrual occurs when plaintiff knows she has been injured)
