Diana Mey v. DIRECTV, LLC, 971 F.3d 284

Background

In March 2012 Diana Mey opened a new AT&T Mobility wireless line and electronically accepted AT&T’s Wireless Customer Agreement, including an arbitration clause and a clause consenting to contact (calls/texts) about services or matters of interest.
The arbitration clause required arbitration of “all disputes and claims between us,” instructed it be given broad interpretation, and defined “AT&T,” “us,” and “we” to include subsidiaries, affiliates, agents, successors, and assigns.
AT&T, Inc. acquired DIRECTV in 2015; Mey received automated/pre-recorded marketing calls from DIRECTV in 2017 and sued DIRECTV under the TCPA, seeking class relief.
DIRECTV moved to compel arbitration under Mey’s AT&T Mobility agreement; the district court denied the motion, holding the TCPA dispute fell outside the arbitration clause.
The Fourth Circuit majority vacated and remanded: it held Mey assented to arbitration, that “affiliates” includes post‑contract affiliates (DIRECTV), and that the clause is sufficiently broad to encompass Mey’s TCPA claims; the court left unconscionability and related defenses for the district court on remand.
Judge Harris dissented, arguing no agreement to arbitrate existed between Mey and DIRECTV because a reasonable AT&T customer would not expect the clause to bind unrelated future corporate affiliates for all claims.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1. Formation: Did Mey assent to the AT&T arbitration clause?	Mey argued she did not sign/assent to arbitration.	DIRECTV argued Mey expressly acknowledged and accepted the Wireless Customer Agreement including arbitration.	Held: Mey assented by signing the on‑screen acknowledgment; agreement binds authorized users.
2. Formation/scope: Does “affiliate” include entities that become affiliates after signing?	Mey argued "affiliate" should be limited to affiliates existing at signing and exclude future acquisitions like DIRECTV.	DIRECTV argued ordinary meaning of "affiliate" (common ownership/control) includes future affiliates; clause also covers successors/assigns.	Held: "Affiliate" includes entities acquired after signing; the clause’s plain, forward‑looking language covers future affiliates.
3. Scope: Do Mey’s TCPA claims against DIRECTV fall within the arbitration clause?	Mey argued TCPA calls advertising DIRECTV are unrelated to the wireless service contract and outside scope.	DIRECTV argued clause’s expansive language ("all disputes and claims between us") plus examples (advertising, statute) covers these claims.	Held: Arbitration clause is broad and "susceptible of an interpretation" covering Mey’s TCPA claims; doubts resolved for arbitration.
4. Unconscionability/waiver: Is the clause unconscionably overbroad or was challenge waived?	Mey and district court suggested the clause could be unconscionably overbroad.	DIRECTV argued Mey waived unconscionability by not raising it below and that clause is neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable.	Held: Fourth Circuit did not decide unconscionability or waiver; remanded for district court to address these defenses.

Key Cases Cited

Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006) (arbitration agreements are enforced like other contracts)
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983) (federal policy favors arbitration; doubts about scope resolved for arbitration)
Granite Rock Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287 (2010) (arbitration is a matter of consent; formation is for courts)
Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019) (ambiguities in arbitration clauses are resolved in favor of arbitration where applicable)
Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989) (courts enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms)
American Recovery Corp. v. Computerized Thermal Imaging, Inc., 96 F.3d 88 (4th Cir. 1996) (standard on scope: clause must be “susceptible of an interpretation” covering the dispute)
Levin v. Alms & Associates, Inc., 634 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 2011) (presumption of arbitrability applies when clause is broadly worded)
Cara’s Notions, Inc. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 140 F.3d 566 (4th Cir. 1998) (enforce parties’ chosen arbitration language; consider whole clause)
New v. GameStop, Inc., 753 S.E.2d 62 (W. Va. 2013) (signing an acknowledgment can indicate assent to arbitration)