Diana Gordon Offord v. April Carson
01-19-00815-CV
| Tex. App. | Aug 3, 2021Background
- Diana Offord was appointed guardian of Winter Gordon’s estate in 2008; a 2010 tax suit final judgment awarded title to the Fulshear Lot to "Diana G. Offord, as Guardian of the Estate of Incapacitated Person, Winter Gordon" based on adverse possession, and a 2010 deed referencing that judgment was recorded.
- Winter Gordon died in 2011; his will was probated in 2015 naming April Carson as sole heir, and the probate inventory listed the Fulshear Lot as an estate asset approved by the probate court.
- In August 2016 Offord’s attorney recorded a "Correction Deed" naming "Diana Gordon Offord" individually (substituting her individual capacity for her prior capacity as guardian). The correction deed was executed only by Offord’s counsel.
- Carson sued in 2018 seeking declaratory relief/quiet title: she alleged the Correction Deed was invalid, clouded her title as heir, and asked the court to cancel it and quiet title in her favor.
- The trial court granted summary judgment: it declared the Correction Deed invalid, cancelled it of record, quieted fee simple title in Carson, and awarded Carson attorney’s fees under the Declaratory Judgment Act.
- On appeal the court affirmed the invalidation of the Correction Deed and the quieting of title in Carson, but modified the judgment to delete the attorney’s fees award.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Carson) | Defendant's Argument (Offord) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Proper procedural vehicle: declaratory/quiet-title v. trespass-to-try-title | Carson framed claim as declaratory/quiet-title to remove cloud created by Correction Deed | Offord argued Carson must bring a trespass-to-try-title action under Tex. Prop. Code ch. 22 | Court: substance controls; Carson’s suit was a quiet-title/declaratory action to remove a cloud (not a trespass-to-try-title claim) and procedural choice was allowable given Offord failed to special-except or obtain ruling |
| 2. Validity of 2016 Correction Deed under Tex. Prop. Code §§ 5.028–5.029 | The Correction Deed attempted a material change (substituting an individual grantee for a guardian) and thus required execution by each original party under § 5.029; lacking that, it is invalid | Offord contended the change was a nonmaterial name correction under § 5.028 (clerical) | Court: change altered identity of grantee (guardian → individual), so it was a material correction requiring signatures of all parties; the Correction Deed was invalid |
| 3. Ownership of the Fulshear Lot (did title vest in Carson) | Carson relied on the 2010 judgment, the probate inventory, the executor’s deed and Gordon’s will showing the lot passed to her as heir | Offord argued the lot never belonged to the estate and that she had acquired title individually | Court: evidence established title vested in Winter Gordon’s estate under the 2010 judgment and passed to Carson by probate; Offord’s self‑serving affidavit insufficient to create fact issue |
| 4. Award of attorney’s fees under the Declaratory Judgment Act | Carson sought fees under DJA for declaratory relief | Offord argued DJA fees unavailable because the suit was essentially a quiet-title action | Court: suit was, in substance, a quiet-title action (attorney’s fees not available); trial court’s award of DJA fees was deleted on appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244 (Tex. 2013) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Bush v. Lone Oak Club, LLC, 601 S.W.3d 639 (Tex. 2020) (summary-judgment evidence viewed in nonmovant’s favor)
- Hillis v. McCall, 602 S.W.3d 436 (Tex. 2020) (traditional summary-judgment burdens)
- Rhône–Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel, 997 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. 1999) (movant must conclusively prove elements)
- Lujan v. Navistar, Inc., 555 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. 2018) (sham affidavit rule and when affidavit cannot create fact issue)
- City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005) (when a matter is conclusively established)
- Brumley v. McDuff, 616 S.W.3d 826 (Tex. 2021) (construing pleadings liberally and substance-over-form for property claims)
- Martin v. Amerman, 133 S.W.3d 262 (Tex. 2004) (purpose of trespass-to-try-title actions)
- Lance v. Robinson, 543 S.W.3d 723 (Tex. 2018) (limits on declaratory relief vs trespass-to-try-title)
- Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp., 417 S.W.3d 909 (Tex. 2013) (trespass-to-try-title exclusivity for establishing title)
- Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. Sawyer Trust, 354 S.W.3d 384 (Tex. 2011) (substance of relief controls over pleading labels)
- Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845 (Tex. 2005) (guardians lack capacity; others sue on ward’s behalf)
- Tanya L. McCabe Trust v. Ranger Energy LLC, 531 S.W.3d 783 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016) (corrections to recorded instruments under Property Code)
- Florey v. Estate of McConnell, 212 S.W.3d 439 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006) (quiet-title/impact-of-deeds on proceeds)
- Eggemeyer v. Hughes, 621 S.W.3d 883 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021) (boundary and title-related declaratory relief)
