Dialysis Newco, Incorporated v. Commty Hlth Sys Tr
938 F.3d 246
5th Cir.2019Background
- Community Health Systems (plan administrator) adopted an ERISA-governed health plan with an express anti-assignment clause and a rule that benefits "must not exceed the Usual and Customary Charges."
- H.S., a covered employee, received out-of-network hemodialysis from Dialysis Newco, which submitted claims and initially was paid in full but, beginning December 2012, was paid only ~8% after MedPartners/Global Excel capped "usual and customary" at 200% of Medicare.
- H.S. signed two "Assignment of Benefits" forms (one authorizing claim submission and direct payment; a later one purported to assign legal claims), and the provider appealed administratively without success; the administrator did not respond to a second-level appeal.
- The provider sued under ERISA seeking ~$776,193 for unpaid treatments. The district court held the plan's anti-assignment clause ambiguous (construed against plan) and alternatively that Tennessee law invalidated anti-assignment clauses, so the provider had standing; it remanded merits issues to the administrator.
- On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held the anti-assignment clause unambiguous (prohibiting assignment and suits by third parties) and held Tennessee's statute requiring enforceable assignments preempted by ERISA; the court reversed, vacated, and rendered dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the plan's anti-assignment clause is ambiguous | Provider: clause is ambiguous and must be construed against drafter, permitting assignment/standing | Plan: clause unambiguously forbids assignment and suits by third parties | Held: clause is unambiguous and prohibits assignment/derivative standing |
| Whether Tenn. Code Ann. §56-7-120(a) (invalidating anti-assignment clauses) is preempted by ERISA | Provider: Tennessee statute applies to plans chosen-law and renders anti-assignment unenforceable | Plan: state statute is valid and Rapides (allowing direct-payment rules) controls | Held: statute is preempted—it "relates to" plan administration and interferes with nationally uniform administration |
| Whether the provider has standing to sue under ERISA | Provider: Assignment / direct-payment authorization gave derivative standing to sue | Plan: anti-assignment bars assignment so provider lacks standing | Held: provider lacked standing; case dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction |
| Whether Rapides controls to preserve state direct-payment/assignment rules | Provider: Rapides permits state rules requiring honor of assignments/direct payments | Plan: Rapides limited to direct-payment authorizations and is distinguishable | Held: Rapides is distinguishable; Tennessee statute requires honoring assignments (not mere direct payments) and is preempted |
Key Cases Cited
- LeTourneau Lifelike Orthotics & Prosthetics, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 298 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2002) (anti-assignment clause with similar language barred provider's suit for benefits)
- Dallas Cty. Hosp. Dist. v. Assocs.’ Health and Welfare Plan, 293 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 2002) (plan-language permitting assignments to network providers created ambiguity that defeated a broad anti-assignment clause)
- La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co. v. Rapides Healthcare Sys., 461 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2006) (held a Louisiana statute requiring honoring direct-payment authorizations was not preempted; court here distinguished Rapides)
- Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936 (2016) (recognized broad scope of ERISA preemption where state law interferes with plan administration)
- Texas Pharmacy Ass’n v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 105 F.3d 1035 (5th Cir. 1997) (state law that dictated plan-structure choices related to ERISA and was preempted)
- Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) (abuse-of-discretion standard applies where plan grants administrator discretionary authority)
- Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Charter Barclay Hosp., Inc., 81 F.3d 53 (7th Cir. 1996) (distinguishes an assignment from a mere authorization to direct payment)
