Dew-Becker v. Wu
178 N.E.3d 1034
Ill.2020Background
- Dew-Becker sued Wu after losing a $100 head-to-head daily fantasy sports (DFS) contest on FanDuel, seeking recovery under 720 ILCS 5/28-8(a).
- Both players paid $109 entry fees; winner received ~$200 and FanDuel took the rake. The contest was NBA-based with nine-player lineups.
- At a bench trial both parties testified; the circuit court entered judgment for Wu, reasoning §28-8(a) did not apply because FanDuel facilitated the wager.
- The appellate court affirmed, reading §28-8(a) to require a direct person-to-person wager and finding practical obstacles to suing anonymous internet opponents.
- The Illinois Supreme Court granted review and affirmed the appellate judgment, but on the alternative ground that the head-to-head DFS contest was not "gambling" under the statute because skill predominates.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Dew-Becker) | Defendant's Argument (Wu) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether money lost in a head-to-head DFS contest is recoverable under §28-8(a) | DFS is illegal gambling; §28-8(a) permits recovery from the winner | DFS is not gambling because outcome is driven by skill | Held: Not recoverable — contest is not "gambling" because skill predominates under the predominant-factor test |
| Whether a third-party intermediary (FanDuel) bars recovery under §28-8(a) | §28-8(a) requires only that one person lose to another; a facilitator does not negate liability | Presence of an intermediary means no direct person-to-person wager, so statute inapplicable | Held: Court rejected a statutory limitation; third-party facilitation does not, by itself, remove §28-8(a) applicability (but outcome turned on lack of gambling) |
| Whether Internet anonymity/screen names prevent suits under §28-8(a) | Anonymity does not preclude suit; discovery and instances of known identity make enforcement possible | Anonymous screen names make identifying and suing winners impracticable | Held: Anonymity does not per se bar recovery; discovery rules can resolve identity issues (practical difficulty not dispositive) |
| Whether applying §28-8(a) to DFS would create an absurd floodgate of litigation or conflict with legislative intent | The statute is intended to deter illegal gambling; any increase in suits furthers that goal | Applying §28-8(a) to DFS would inundate courts and is inconsistent with changing gambling law | Held: Floodgate concerns are speculative and do not justify reading a limitation into the statute; nevertheless §28-8(a) did not apply here because the contest is not gambling |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Manning, 2018 IL 122081 (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
- People v. Alexander, 204 Ill. 2d 472 (2003) (use of plain statutory text to ascertain legislative intent)
- Petersen v. Wallach, 198 Ill. 2d 439 (2002) (when statute unambiguous, courts apply its plain language)
- Zellers v. White, 208 Ill. 518 (1904) (interpreting predecessor to §28-8(a))
- O'Brien v. Scott, 89 A.2d 280 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1952) (quoted defining predominant-factor test)
- Joker Club, LLC v. Hardin, 643 S.E.2d 626 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (application of predominant-factor test to distinguish skill from chance)
- United States v. Resnick, 594 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 2010) (recovery provisions serve deterrent/enforcement purposes)