Devyn Corporation v. The City of Bloomington, Illinois
38 N.E.3d 1266
Ill. App. Ct.2015Background
- In 1986 Bloomington created the Downtown Bloomington Tax Increment Redevelopment Project Area (District) with an estimated completion date of December 21, 2009; the city never adopted an ordinance extending that date.
- Devyn Corporation owns property in the District; the city collected incremental property taxes through 2009 (final receipts in 2010) and spent District funds on projects after December 21, 2009, including commitments made at a December 28, 2009 city-council meeting.
- Devyn sued (amended complaint, Oct. 2011) under the Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act: Count I (mandamus) was dismissed by agreement; Count II sought an equitable accounting of the District fund; Count III sought declaratory relief alleging unlawful levying/appropriation of taxes after the Plan's estimated completion date.
- The parties cross-moved for summary judgment on Count III; the trial court granted summary judgment for the city (Dec. 2013), holding the estimated completion date was just an estimate and the city lawfully received 2009 levies paid in 2010. The court later granted summary judgment for the city on Count II (Apr. 29, 2014) and denied Devyn leave to file a further amended complaint (Sept. 4, 2014).
- Devyn appealed; the appellate court held it had jurisdiction (appeal timely from denial of leave to amend) and considered three issues: Count III, Count II, and denial of leave to amend.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether levies collected/received after the Plan's estimated completion (Dec. 21, 2009) were unlawfully retained/used (Count III) | The District terminated on the stated estimated date (Dec. 21, 2009); taxes levied in 2009 but collected in 2010 were surplus and must be returned to overlapping taxing bodies | The "estimated date" is just an estimate; statutory changes allow collection/payment timing tied to calendar year end (Dec. 31) and the city lawfully collected/payments for 2009 levies received in 2010 | The estimated date is only an estimate; the city did not act unlawfully. Summary judgment for city affirmed. |
| Whether Devyn is entitled to an equitable accounting of the District fund (Count II) | City failed to provide required annual/TIF reports and accurate accounting; equitable accounting needed because of lack of adequate legal remedy and possible misallocation | City produced certified annual financial reports, detailed ledgers, and provided the same information in discovery; FOIA and discovery were adequate legal remedies | Devyn had an adequate remedy at law (FOIA, discovery) and received the ledgers showing receipts/disbursements; no basis for equitable accounting. Summary judgment for city affirmed. |
| Whether the trial court erred denying motion for rehearing on Count III (newly discovered evidence) | City manager's 1986 statements (allegedly newly discovered) would show intent and affect interpretation | Evidence was not shown to be newly discovered or excused for late presentation | Issue forfeited by inadequate briefing; even on merits, Devyn failed to explain why evidence was not available earlier, so rehearing denial proper. |
| Whether trial court abused discretion denying leave to file third amended complaint | Proposed amendment would cure defects (add fraud and fiduciary-duty claims, seek fees) and was timely | Litigation was prolonged, amendment came late, proposed claims would prejudice city and did not directly cure Count II defects | Trial court did not abuse discretion; Loyola factors weigh against Devyn (prejudice, untimeliness, inadequate cure). Denial affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Henry County Board v. Village of Orion, 278 Ill. App. 3d 1058 (discusses purpose and mechanics of tax-increment financing)
- Barber v. City of Springfield, 406 Ill. App. 3d 1099 (explains placement of incremental tax revenues in a special TIF fund)
- Andersen v. Resource Economics Corp., 133 Ill. 2d 342 (postjudgment motions and effect on appeal timing)
- Fultz v. Haugan, 49 Ill. 2d 131 (motion to amend is not a postjudgment motion that tolls appeal periods)
- Pielet v. Pielet, 2012 IL 112064 (cross-motions for summary judgment and standard of review)
- Polikoff v. Levy, 132 Ill. App. 2d 492 (equitable accounting defined as statement of receipts and disbursements)
- Loyola Academy v. S&S Roof Maintenance, Inc., 146 Ill. 2d 263 (factors to consider when denying leave to amend)