Deveaux Carter v. Allen Davis, 241 So. 3d 614

Carter sought enforcement of a 20-year-old divorce decree, claiming Davis failed to pay child support and children’s medical, college, and other expenses.
The chancery court calculated Davis’s total obligations under the decree as $201,187.66.
The chancellor credited substantial direct payments made by Davis and payments by Davis’s mother totaling $197,911 toward those obligations.
After credits, the chancery court found Davis owed $3,276.66 in past-due support, declined to find willful contempt, but awarded Carter $7,500 in attorney’s fees for enforcing the decree.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the crediting of payments but reversed the attorney’s-fee award because there was no finding of willful contempt.
The Mississippi Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the attorney’s-fees issue and reinstated the chancery court’s award of $7,500, while affirming the Court of Appeals on the crediting issue.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a party who enforces a child-support decree must show willful contempt to recover attorney’s fees	Carter: Attorney’s fees are recoverable where there is default in child support even without willful contempt	Davis: No willful contempt, so fees should not be awarded	Held: Fees may be awarded without a finding of willful contempt when there is a default in support; chancery court did not err
Whether payments by defendant and defendant’s mother could be credited against support arrearage	Carter: Some payments contested as not qualifying as credit	Davis: Direct payments and mother’s payments should be credited toward obligations	Held: Court of Appeals properly affirmed chancery court’s credits for direct and third‑party payments
Whether the amount of attorney’s fees awarded was an abuse of discretion	Carter: $7,500 was reasonable based on record	Davis: Fee award improper given no willful contempt (and implicitly challenges amount)	Held: $7,500 was supported by record and within the chancellor’s sound discretion
Whether McKnight v. Jenkins compels reversal of attorney’s fees here	Carter: McKnight is distinguishable because here there was an enforceable obligation and an acknowledged arrearage	Davis: Relies on McKnight to argue fees improper absent willful contempt	Held: McKnight distinguished; it involved no underlying obligation, so does not control here

Mizell v. Mizell, 708 So. 2d 55 (Miss. 1998) (party enforcing child-support decree entitled to attorney’s fees for default even without willful contempt)
Moore v. Moore, 372 So. 2d 270 (Miss. 1979) (award of attorney’s fees to enforce support to prevent net reduction of support by enforcement costs)
Pearson v. Hatcher, 279 So. 2d 654 (Miss. 1973) (same principle that enforcing party may recover fees despite lack of willful contempt)
McKnight v. Jenkins, 155 So. 3d 730 (Miss. 2013) (distinguished: involved no obligation under the support order, so fees and award were reversed)