Detrich v. Ryan
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 18247
9th Cir.2013Background
- Detrich was sentenced to death after a state murder/kidnapping/sexual abuse conviction and pursued habeas relief in district court.
- The district court held several of Det-rich’s trial-counsel IAC claims were procedurally defaulted under state law because they were not raised in state PCR.
- Martinez v. Ryan (2012) held that state PCR counsel’s ineffectiveness can excuse procedural default for trial-counsel IAC claims; Det-rich moved for remand to raise Martinez issues first.
- The en banc Ninth Circuit granted remand to the district court to determine whether there was cause under Martinez to excuse the defaults.
- The court outlined Martinez/Trevino frameworks and signaled it would remand to decide whether the defaulted claims are ‘substantial’ and thus potentially excusable.
- The opinion emphasizes that discovery/evidentiary development may be appropriate in Martinez remands to assess ‘cause’ and underlying IAC claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Martinez excused procedural default for trial-counsel IAC claims | Detrich argues Martinez creates cause to excuse default when PCR counsel was ineffective. | Detrich's opponents contend Martinez only applies where the underlying IAC claim is substantial and not previously raised. | Remand to district court to determine Martinez cause first. |
| Whether discovery and an evidentiary hearing are warranted on remand | Martinez permits factual development to determine cause and the merits of the IAC claims. | Factual development may be unnecessary if the claims lack substantial merit. | District court should conduct discovery/hearings if appropriate to decide Martinez cause and substantiate substantiality. |
| Whether new trial-counsel IAC claims may be considered under Martinez | Martinez permits new IAC claims not raised by PCR counsel if substantively substantial. | Some claims may be procedurally defaulted or meritless; not all are eligible for Martinez remand. | Martinez remand appropriate to evaluate substantiality and cause for the defaulted trial-counsel IAC claims. |
Key Cases Cited
- Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012) (establishes cause to excuse default for ineffective state PCR counsel when underlying IAC is substantial)
- Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013) (expands Martinez to further contexts regarding initial-review collateral proceedings)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011) (limits evidentiary development in federal habeas review; not controlling in Martinez remands)
- Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (establishes the traditional cause-and-prejudice framework for procedural defaults)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (no constitutional right to counsel in state PCR; applies cause for default analysis)
- Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) (substantiality standard for assessing claims on appeal)
- Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) (prejudice standard for ineffective assistance and procedural defaults)
- Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2004) (application of Strickland prejudice to habeas review)
- Gallow v. Cooper, 133 S. Ct. 2730 (2013) (discusses Martinez-related considerations in procedural-default context)
