Detournay v. City of Coral Gables
2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 19270
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2013Background
- Amace Properties operates a commercial property on a Coral Gables canal and rents boat slips; City issued administrative citations but later abated enforcement while negotiating redevelopment.
- Homeowners (two adjacent homeowners and their neighborhood association) sued the City seeking: (Count I) declaratory relief on whether the use is illegal and the City violated its zoning code, and (Count II) an injunction to stop the yacht basin.
- Amace intervened as a defendant; the City asserted prosecutorial/enforcement discretion and later moved to dismiss for lack of standing.
- Trial court dismissed Count I for lack of standing and ruled for the City on Count II; Homeowners appealed.
- The appellate majority affirmed dismissal of Count I (on separation-of-powers grounds rather than standing) and directed dismissal of Count II, holding judicial supervision of a municipality’s discretionary decision whether/how to enforce zoning is barred absent a specific constitutional or statutory violation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiffs may obtain declaratory relief compelling enforcement of a city zoning ordinance | Homeowners: they have a bona fide interest and suffer special harms (noise, congestion, erosion, privacy loss) and thus can seek declaratory relief and injunctive enforcement | City: enforcement is discretionary; courts cannot compel or supervise prosecutorial/enforcement decisions; also argued lack of standing | Majority: dismissal affirmed under separation of powers — municipal discretion to enforce zoning is an executive function not subject to court supervision absent specific legal violation |
| Whether plaintiffs can obtain injunctive relief requiring enforcement or abatement | Homeowners: injunctive relief is appropriate if court declares the use illegal and City failed to enforce | City: same prosecutorial/discretionary immunity argument; injunctive relief would improperly direct executive action | Held: Count II dismissed for same separation-of-powers rationale; courts may adjudicate enforcement actions when properly presented but cannot direct a city’s prosecutorial choices |
| Whether standing/special injury was required and properly decided | Homeowners (dissent): declaratory judgment statute does not require special injury; if required, at least the two homeowners alleged special damages | City: raised standing late at trial, argued no special injury shown | Majority: did not rest on standing — resolved on separation-of-powers; dissent would have reversed on standing/special-damage grounds |
| Whether plaintiffs could sue Amace directly (not decided) | Homeowners: could seek relief against Amace if desired | City/majority: case presented against City; court need not address direct suit against Amace | Held: Court expressly declined to rule on direct action against Amace because Homeowners did not plead claims against it |
Key Cases Cited
- Trianon Park Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 468 So.2d 912 (Fla. 1985) (enforcement of building/zoning codes is a discretionary executive function; courts should not oversee prosecutorial discretion)
- Boucher v. Novotny, 102 So.2d 132 (Fla. 1958) (private plaintiffs seeking to enjoin zoning violations must allege special damages to pursue equitable relief)
- Renard v. Dade County, 261 So.2d 832 (Fla. 1972) (special-damage rule derived from public-nuisance principles but should be applied more leniently over time)
- Fortunato v. City of Coral Gables, 47 So.2d 321 (Fla. 1950) (plaintiff alleging detailed special and peculiar damages may obtain injunctive relief against zoning violations)
- Alexander v. City of Coral Gables, 745 So.2d 1004 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (mandamus does not lie to compel a city to enforce zoning regulations because enforcement decisions are discretionary)