990 F.3d 264
2d Cir.2021Background
- Linden Plaza, a privately owned affordable housing complex in Brooklyn, sought HUD/HPD approval to raise rents in 2007; the owner submitted a HUD application that included approximately $140 million in "decoupling" expenses that helped justify the increases.
- Tenants received notice and participated in HPD proceedings but were not given the HUD application details; HUD approved the application in December 2007 and HPD in March 2008.
- Tenants first learned in April 2011 (and obtained further detail in 2013) that decoupling expenses in the HUD application contributed to the rent increases.
- In 2018 the Tenants sued: asserting state-law claims against the owner, APA claims against HUD for procedural violations (including alleged deviation from 24 C.F.R. § 245.330 and reliance on Notice H 00-8), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against New York City/HPD for discriminatory policy favoring preservation transactions.
- The district court dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6) for lack of standing on one APA theory and as time-barred; the Tenants appealed.
- The Second Circuit affirmed: it held the Tenants lack standing to challenge the approval-sequence rule; all federal claims were untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (with § 2401(a) treated as a claims-processing rule); equitable tolling and the continuing-violation doctrine did not rescue the claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| APA standing to challenge HUD's use of Notice H 00-8 vs. 24 C.F.R. § 245.330 (order-of-approval claim) | Tenants: the local-to-federal approval sequence was required and protected tenants' participation rights; deviation injures tenants. | HUD: Notice H 00-8 preserved tenant participation protections; order of approval was not a right designed to protect tenants' concrete interests. | No standing: the sequence itself was not designed to protect tenants’ concrete interests; tenant participation protections existed regardless of order. |
| Timeliness of APA claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) | Tenants: accrual should run from when they discovered the full HUD application details (post-2007), delaying the limitations period. | Federal Defs: claims accrued at final agency action (2007) or, at latest, when tenants learned the basis (2011); suit filed in 2018 is beyond six years. | Time-barred: claims accrued no later than April 2011; filed after six-year limit; dismissed. |
| Nature of § 2401(a) deadline: jurisdictional bar vs. claims-processing rule | Tenants: (implicitly) may seek collateral or equitable relief if § 2401(a) is jurisdictional. | Defs: § 2401(a) restricts suits but does not divest courts of jurisdiction in the same manner as a jurisdictional bar. | § 2401(a) is a claims-processing rule, not jurisdictional; court may consider equitable tolling—but tolling denied here. |
| Timeliness of § 1983 claims and continuing-violation doctrine | Tenants: City’s ongoing pro-preservation policy makes approvals a continuing violation, saving time-barred discrete approvals. | City/HPD: each approval (2008, 2014) was a discrete act with independent accrual; claims are barred after 3 years. | Dismissed: § 1983 claims subject to 3-year limit; continuing-violation doctrine does not apply to discrete administrative approvals. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (procedural-rights standing framework)
- Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (claim accrual and "zone of interests" analysis)
- United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. 402 (distinguishing jurisdictional rules from claims-processing rules)
- Sai Kwan Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247 (accrual of APA claims tied to final agency action)
- Jackson v. Modly, 949 F.3d 763 (treating § 2401(a) as nonjurisdictional)
- Chance v. Zinke, 898 F.3d 1025 (same regarding § 2401(a))
- Clymore v. United States, 217 F.3d 370 (timeliness under § 2401(a) as nonjurisdictional in Fifth Circuit precedent)
- Gonzalez v. Hasty, 802 F.3d 212 (continuing-violation doctrine standards)
- Milan v. Wertheimer, 808 F.3d 961 (3-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims)
- Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76 (equitable tolling standard)
