Destyn David Frederick v. State, 04-14-00246-CR

On June 13, 2011, Destyn David Frederick, Marcus Serna, and Rigo Guerra drove to a Cotulla residence intending to burglarize homes; Frederick supplied a shotgun that was carried during the trip.
The three entered the Casas property; Guerra (the shooter) fatally shot Israel Casas and seriously wounded Guadalupe Casas. Frederick and Serna had been in the garage/door area and later left the scene in Frederick’s truck with the shotgun.
Evidence at trial included statements by Frederick (two statements), testimony from accomplice Marcus Serna (who admitted participation and gave details), physical evidence (DNA on a soda can from the Casas property), and testimony about the shotgun being later loaded (trip to Serna’s house for shells).
Frederick was convicted of felony murder under Tex. Penal Code § 19.02(b)(3) (murder committed in the course of burglary), and he appealed, arguing (1) that Serna was an accomplice whose testimony required corroboration and (2) that the evidence was legally insufficient to support felony murder.
The State’s brief argues that, even discounting Serna’s testimony under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.14, multiple corroborating facts (possession/provision of the gun, concealment of the truck, transporting Guerra to another robbery, consuming Casas’ soda, inconsistent statements) tend to connect Frederick to the offense.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Frederick)	Held (as argued by State)
1. Sufficiency under accomplice corroboration rule (Art. 38.14)	Corroborating non-accomplice evidence (gun provision, concealment of truck, transporting shooter, soda can DNA, inconsistent statements) tends to connect Frederick to the burglary/shooting.	Serna is an accomplice; without his testimony the evidence does not connect Frederick to the murder.	The State: corroborating evidence is sufficient to satisfy the accomplice-witness rule; appellate court should affirm.
2. Legal sufficiency of felony-murder conviction (Penal Code § 19.02(b)(3))	Viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict (including accomplice testimony), a rational juror could find Frederick guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because he supplied/armed the burglary and should have reasonably anticipated a killing.	Frederick argues he merely handed an unloaded gun or was only present; lacked intent and should not be held responsible for Guerra’s shooting.	The State: the evidence permits reasonable inferences of intent/anticipation and supports felony-murder culpability; appellate court should affirm.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (standard for legal sufficiency review: evidence must permit a rational juror to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt)
Malone v. State, 253 S.W.3d 253 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (review requires determining whether non-accomplice evidence tends to connect the accused)
Trevino v. State, 991 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (clarifies sufficiency standard when accomplice testimony is discounted)
Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (intent may be inferred from cumulative circumstantial evidence)
Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (mere presence is insufficient but presence plus suspicious circumstances may corroborate guilt)
Reed v. State, 744 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (all facts and circumstances may be considered in accomplice-witness corroboration analysis)
Gross v. State, 380 S.W.3d 181 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (distinguishes cases where defendant did not reasonably foresee a shooting from those where the defendant did)
Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (deference to jury credibility determinations in sufficiency review)