Desmarais v. Scientific Research Corp.
145 F. Supp. 3d 595
D.S.C.2015Background
- Roger Desmarais, hired by Scientific Research Corporation (SRC) as an air traffic controller and tower manager at McMurdo Station, Antarctica, repeatedly complained that contract weather observers in the tower were distracting and violated FAA/USN guidance.
- SRC employed Roger under an at-will relationship; SRC provided services under a SPAWAR contract and government officials had final authority over facility decisions.
- Meetings in mid‑2011 led to an expectation the observers would be moved to the lower level, but SPAWAR later directed that observers remain in the tower cab.
- After Roger refused to work under the observed configuration and reiterated his objections, he was removed from the station and later informed he had been manifested off the ice.
- An Interim Inspector General investigation concluded the observers did not violate federal requirements; Roger filed suit in 2014 alleging wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.
- SRC moved for summary judgment arguing (inter alia) that Roger’s claim does not implicate a clear mandate of public policy; the court granted SRC’s motion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Roger’s discharge falls within South Carolina’s public‑policy exception to at‑will employment | Roger contends he was retaliated against for complaining about unlawful/unsafe placement of weather observers (violations of FAA/USN rules) | SRC contends there is no clear mandate of public policy protecting internal complaints about such regulatory violations and Roger was not terminated for a policy‑protected reason | Court held Roger failed to identify a clear mandate of public policy; claim fails as a matter of law |
| Whether SRC required Roger to violate law or was terminated in violation of a criminal statute | Roger implies the observers’ presence caused unlawful conditions contrary to federal aviation rules | SRC and record show no criminal statute was implicated and IG found no regulatory violation | Court held Roger did not allege being required to violate a criminal law nor that termination itself violated a criminal law |
| Whether a good‑faith belief about illegality suffices to extend the public‑policy exception | Roger relied on his belief and internal complaints about illegality | SRC argued Antley and related precedent disallow extending the exception for mere good‑faith belief without an authoritative legal mandate | Court followed precedent refusing to extend the exception for mere good‑faith belief; claim fails |
| Whether existing administrative remedies or investigations preclude the common‑law claim | Roger proceeded after filing with Navy and IG investigated | SRC pointed to the IG’s conclusion and argued absence of a legislative/judicial declaration of public policy | Court noted IG’s finding and emphasized that public policy must be derived from statutes or binding judicial precedent; declined to expand exception |
Key Cases Cited
- Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, 287 S.C. 219, 337 S.E.2d 213 (S.C. 1985) (recognizes public‑policy exception where employer forces employee to violate criminal law)
- Culler v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., Inc., 309 S.C. 243, 422 S.E.2d 91 (S.C. 1992) (public‑policy exception also applies where termination itself violates criminal law)
- Taghivand v. Rite Aid Corp., 411 S.C. 240, 768 S.E.2d 385 (S.C. 2015) (court exercises restraint in expanding public‑policy exception and looks to legislative or judicial declaration of policy)