Desiree Martinez v. City of Clovis, 943 F.3d 1260

Background

Martinez was repeatedly abused by Kyle Pennington, a Clovis police officer; key incidents occurred May 2, 2013 and June 4, 2013.
On May 2 Officer Kristina Hershberger responded after Martinez fled an assault; Hershberger allegedly disclosed Martinez’s prior complaint to Pennington, made disparaging comments about Martinez, did not arrest, and failed to provide DV resources.
On June 4 Officers Angela Yambupah and Sergeant Fred Sanders responded after a 911 domestic-violence call; Yambupah observed injuries and believed there was probable cause, but Sanders (acting supervisor) ordered no arrest, spoke positively about the Penningtons in Pennington’s presence, and officers did not provide protective measures or handouts.
After both police contacts, Pennington assaulted Martinez again; he was later arrested and convicted on related charges.
Martinez sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting a state-created danger substantive-due-process claim against the officers and municipalities; the district court granted summary judgment for several defendants and Martinez appealed.
The Ninth Circuit concluded Hershberger’s and Sanders’s affirmative conduct could have created a state-created danger (a due-process violation) but held both officers nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity; it affirmed summary judgment for the officers (and for Yambupah as to due process).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether officers’ conduct created a state-created danger violating substantive due process	Officers affirmatively increased Martinez’s risk by disclosing her report, making disparaging comments, praising the abuser, and ordering no arrest	Police failures (non‑arrest, not separating, not giving resources) are omissions and do not create constitutional liability	A jury could find Hershberger’s disclosure/disparagement and Sanders’s praise/order not to arrest affirmatively increased danger (state-created danger met); Yambupah’s failures did not
Whether failure to arrest alone gives rise to a due-process violation	Failure contributed to emboldening abuser	Failure to arrest is not by itself unconstitutional	Failure to arrest alone insufficient, but may inform the context/manner in which other affirmative acts communicate impunity
Whether the officers’ conduct was foreseeable and showed deliberate indifference	Subsequent assaults were foreseeable given prior violence and defendant-officer knowledge; officers ignored obvious risk	Conduct was reasonable or not clearly blameworthy; no culpable mental state shown	The assaults were foreseeable; a reasonable jury could find deliberate indifference as to Hershberger and Sanders
Whether the right was clearly established (qualified immunity)	Prior decisions (e.g., Okin) put officers on notice that such conduct was unconstitutional	No controlling Ninth Circuit or Supreme Court precedent made the rule beyond debate; law was unsettled among circuits	Right was not clearly established at the time; qualified immunity applies to Hershberger and Sanders; summary judgment affirmed

Key Cases Cited

DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (state generally has no constitutional duty to protect from private violence)
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (qualified immunity two‑part framework)
Hernandez v. City of San Jose, 897 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir.) (state‑created danger elements and analysis)
Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir.) (officer’s affirmative act can create danger by informing assailant)
Okin v. Village of Cornwall‑on‑Hudson Police Dept., 577 F.3d 415 (2d Cir.) (officers’ dismissive conduct could have enhanced danger to domestic‑violence victim)
White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (clearly established law must be particularized)
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (no constitutional right to have third party arrested; limits on duty to protect)
L.W. v. Grubbs, 92 F.3d 894 (9th Cir.) (state‑created danger precedent where state action increased risk)