Deshotels v. Deshotels
150 So. 3d 541
| La. Ct. App. | 2014Background
- Alverda and Seldon Deshotels married in 1986; a purported prenuptial agreement was presented as converting the regime to separate property.
- Ms. Deshotels filed for divorce (Dec. 2010) and then petitioned to partition community property after divorce; Dr. Deshotels relied on the recorded agreement to assert no community estate existed.
- Two versions of the agreement exist: Ms. Deshotels’ copy had blank date, blank witness and notary lines; the recorded St. Landry Parish copy showed filled date, witnesses, and a notary signature (and signs of alteration on the original file).
- Trial court found the agreement was not an authentic act nor properly acknowledged before marriage, but concluded Ms. Deshotels’ in-court admission that she signed and understood its purpose created a judicially enforceable natural obligation and dismissed the partition petition.
- On appeal, the court reviewed formal requirements for matrimonial agreements (authentic act or private signature duly acknowledged before marriage) and evaluated whether a natural obligation arose from Ms. Deshotels’ admission.
- The appellate court reversed: it held the prenuptial agreement was invalid for want of required form and the record did not support that a natural obligation arose from the in-court admission.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Deshotels) | Defendant's Argument (Ms. Deshotels) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of prenuptial agreement | Agreement effectually created a separate-property regime | Agreement was not executed in required form before marriage (no notary/acknowledgment) | Agreement invalid for want of form; prenuptial agreements must satisfy Art. 2331 formalities before marriage |
| Effect of in-court admission | Ms. Deshotels’ admission she signed and understood the agreement creates a natural obligation enforceable by court | Admission cannot retroactively cure lack of required form; insufficient evidence of intent or performance to create a natural obligation | Reversed: admission did not establish a natural obligation under Article 1760–1762 and supporting jurisprudence |
| Standard for construing matrimonial-formalities | Not specifically disputed | Formalities construe stricti juris because of policy protecting community rights | Strict compliance required; absent proper acknowledgment before marriage, notarized/authentic form cannot be presumed |
| Burden to prove intent/performance for natural obligation | Argument that signing + admission shows intent to be bound | Contends no clear intent, no promise/performance, no moral duty proven | Court: record lacks testimony of moral duty, intent to bind, or performance; natural obligation not established |
Key Cases Cited
- Rush v. Rush, 115 So.3d 508 (2013) (formalities for modifying matrimonial regime are construed stricti juris)
- Thomas v. Bryant, 639 So.2d 378 (1994) (five-factor analysis for when a moral duty becomes a natural obligation; appellate standard for fact findings)
- Lauga v. Lauga, 537 So.2d 758 (1989) (prenuptial agreements not properly executed before marriage are unenforceable)
- Ritz v. Ritz, 666 So.2d 1181 (1995) (pre-nuptial agreements must meet prescribed form to be effective)
- Azaretta v. Manalla, 768 So.2d 179 (2000) (existence of natural obligation is a factual finding reviewed for manifest error)
- State v. Placke, 786 So.2d 889 (2001) (determination of natural obligation depends on case-specific facts)