Deshawn Ondrey Williams v. State
2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 4109
| Tex. App. | 2014Background
- Appellant Deshawn Williams was convicted of terroristic threats on a public servant in Bexar County, Texas.
- The offense involved a March 19, 2011 confrontation with John Barfield, a probation officer, in Barfield's driveway.
- Barfield testified Williams yelled threats including promises to bury him in Williams’s courtroom next week and to throw him out, with Williams claiming contact would occur in court.
- Barfield testified he feared imminent serious bodily injury and retrieved a gun afterward; police were called the same day.
- Williams argued the threats were to future events and could not place Barfield in imminent fear; the State argued the threat and surrounding conduct showed intent to place in fear of imminent harm.
- The trial court found Williams indigent and assessed attorney’s fees; on appeal, the court modified the judgment to remove those fees and affirmed as modified.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for intent | Williams intended to place Barfield in fear of imminent injury. | Threats referenced future events; no imminent fear was created. | Sufficient evidence supported intent to place in fear. |
| Imminent fear from a future-threat | Words plus conduct showed imminent fear despite future-oriented wording. | A threat conditioned on a future event cannot be imminent. | Imminence can be inferred from context and conduct; not limited to literal timing. |
| Consideration of nonverbal conduct and relationship | Barfield’s fear was reinforced by Williams’s size, proximity, and nonverbal actions. | Only the words should determine intent; conduct is not dispositive. | Nonverbal conduct and longstanding relationship supported the inference of intent. |
| Attorney’s fees on indigence finding | Indigence finding supports costs; fees may be appropriate. | Trial court’s indigence finding did not support fee assessment; fees should be removed. | Attorney’s fees removed; judgment modified accordingly. |
Key Cases Cited
- Dues v. State, 634 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (focus on intent to place victim in fear, not immediate injury only)
- Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (focus on defendant’s intent and reaction contemplated by victim)
- Phillips v. State, 401 S.W.3d 282 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013) (focus on intended reaction; not restricted to magic words)
- Cook v. State, 940 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1997) (definition of threat and sufficiency of intent from words and conduct)
- Devine v. State, 786 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (imminence and threat analysis framework)
- Mayberry v. State, 351 S.W.3d 507 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011) (imminence and surrounding circumstances v. isolated words)
- Bryant v. State, 905 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. App.—Waco 1995) (conditioning threat on future event negates immediacy in some contexts)
- Poteet v. State, 957 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997) (presence, conduct, and threat context support fear of imminent injury)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1979) (sufficiency standard: rational juror could find elements beyond reasonable doubt)
- Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (credibility and weight are jury’s to assess)
- In re A.C., 48 S.W.3d 899 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001) (evidence of intent may be inferred from words and conduct)