Deshawn Hutcherson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), 29A04-1708-CR-1698

In June 2016 Hutcherson, who was on community corrections with permitted work release, failed to return to custody and was charged with failure to return to lawful detention (Level 6 felony).
Hutcherson pleaded guilty in January 2017 under a plea agreement, but at sentencing in April 2017 a dispute over credit time led him to withdraw the plea and proceed to trial; the Information was later amended to add a habitual-offender enhancement.
On the morning of trial Hutcherson waived a jury and requested a bench trial, explaining he only pursued trial because of the credit-time dispute and making statements implying he believed he was guilty.
After a bench trial the court found Hutcherson guilty; the habitual-offender enhancement was later vacated and Hutcherson was sentenced to 2.5 years.
Hutcherson appealed, arguing the trial judge should have sua sponte recused himself because Hutcherson’s pretrial statements (admissions during plea negotiations and his bench-trial waiver comments) showed guilt and required recusal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether judge committed fundamental error by failing to sua sponte recuse after Hutcherson’s pretrial statements	Hutcherson: his pretrial admissions and statements requesting a bench trial effectively conceded guilt and created judicial bias requiring recusal	State: judge had no demonstrated bias; pretrial admissions and plea negotiations do not automatically disqualify a judge and the record shows no partiality	Court: No fundamental error; judge need not recuse for knowledge of plea negotiations or a defendant’s admissions absent other evidence of bias

Garland v. State, 788 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 2003) (presumption that judges are unbiased and burden to rebut with evidence of actual bias)
Smith v. State, 770 N.E.2d 818 (Ind. 2002) (defendant must show judge’s conduct demonstrates actual bias placing defendant in jeopardy)
Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670 (Ind. 2013) (fundamental-error doctrine is narrow and applies only to blatant violations denying due process)
Timberlake v. State, 690 N.E.2d 243 (Ind. 1997) (judicial remarks showing impatience may be permissible if they do not create appearance of partiality)
Gibson v. State, 449 N.E.2d 1096 (Ind. 1983) (trial judges commonly know pretrial admissions and may compartmentalize such knowledge and remain impartial)
Garrett v. State, 737 N.E.2d 388 (Ind. 2000) (failure to object at trial waives appellate review of judge’s remarks absent fundamental error)