Desert Water Agency v. United States Department of the Interior
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4007
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- DWA, a California political subdivision, sues Interior and the BIA to challenge 25 C.F.R. § 162.017 as potentially preempting its charges on non-Indians leasing Tribal lands.
- Interior’s regulation 162.017 states leases may not be subject to state or local taxes, except taxes by the tribe, and contains a preemption-like framing within 'applicable Federal law'.
- DWA alleges the rule would preempt its charges and seeks a declaratory judgment that § 162.017 does not apply to its taxation.
- District court dismissed for lack of standing, emphasizing no alleged enforcement threat or changed behavior by DWA or lessees.
- On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviews standing de novo, focusing on what § 162.017 purports to do and whether DWA is the 'object' of the regulation.
- Court ultimately holds § 162.017 does not preempt or change existing Bracker-law and DWA lacks standing to challenge the regulation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does § 162.017 preempt Bracker or modify law? | DWA: § 162.017 preempts Bracker and directly displaces state taxes. | Interior: § 162.017 does not change law; it clarifies Bracker and does not preempt specific charges. | § 162.017 does not preempt Bracker or preempt specific charges. |
| Does DWA have standing to challenge § 162.017? | DWA has injury and redressable injury from preemption of its charges. | No injury in fact or redressable injury; third-party lessees’ actions are not before court. | DWA lacks standing. |
| Is § 162.017 an independent rule with direct effects on DWA's rights? | § 162.017 directly alters rights and preempts charges. | It merely clarifies existing law and does not create independent legal effects. | Regulation does not have independent preemptive effect. |
| Is declaratory relief appropriate here to answer whether leaseholders would be bound by preemption? | A declaration would settle whether leaseholders must continue paying. | The controversy is between DWA and Interior; leaseholders are not before the court. | No jurisdiction for declaratory relief on leaseholder action; not ripe. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (establishes three-part standing test)
- White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980) (balanced, fact-specific preemption analysis in Indian regulation)
- Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Stranburg, 799 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2015) (interprets § 162.017 as outlining Bracker analysis rather than preemption)
- Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation v. Thurston Cty. Bd. of Equalization, 724 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2013) (§ 162.017 clarifies existing law, not creates new preemption)
- Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) (injury in fact must be concrete and imminent for standing)
- Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (standing not established when relief would solely affect third parties)
- Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983) (federal courts should not entertain state-law validity suits against federal law)
- Nat'l Park Hospitality Ass'n v. Dep't of Interior, 538 U.S. 803 (2003) (interprets agency statements and rules within judicial review framework)