Desak v. Vanlandingham, 98 So. 3d 710

Wilma Desak, as personal representative of Helen Desak's estate, sues Vanlandingham Farms, Inc. under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act to recover from a 2003 transfer alleged to defraud the estate.
The transfer allegedly occurred when Lawrence Taylor conveyed lands in Gadsden County to VLFI, recorded February 19, 2003 (OR Book 560 Page 976, Instrument No. 0301849).
The second amended complaint (Aug. 16, 2010) asserts the transfer was made with actual intent to defraud the estate, which would become a future creditor through the wrongful death action.
VLFI moved to dismiss under § 726.110(1), arguing the action is untimely because the one-year discovery savings period began when the deed was recorded.
The trial court dismissed the fraudulent transfer claim with prejudice, holding the claim barred as a matter of law.
On appeal, the court held that recording alone does not as a matter of law start the savings period and reversed/remanded for factual development.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether discovery could reasonably have occurred within 1 year after transfer	Desak contends discovery is a factual question; the one-year period could extend if discovery was reasonably possible within that year.	VLFI contends the savings clause began when the deed was recorded, foreclosing any later discovery-based extension.	Issue resolved in favor of remand; facts must determine discovery timing.
Whether recording a deed starts the savings period under §726.110(1)	Desak argues recording alone does not trigger the one-year clock for discovery.	VLFI argues recording provides constructive notice and starts the savings period.	Recording does not by itself start the savings period.
Whether the discovery rule applies to fraudulent transfers absent third-party notice	Desak asserts no need to monitor multi-county records; lack of notice should prevent bar.	VLFI asserts standard notice rules apply and recording suffices to begin awareness.	Court remands to develop facts; not resolved on record.
Whether the complaint adequately alleges facts to trigger the discovery clock	Desak alleges facts that should show discovery within a year if reasonable diligence is applied.	VLFI argues there are no pleaded facts showing notice within one year of the transfer.	Remand to determine whether pleadings support discovery-based extension.

Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dolgencorp, Inc., 964 So.2d 261 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (notice and discovery concepts, recording effects described)
Freligh v. Maurer, 111 So.2d 712 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959) (recording as notice concept discussed)
Bakalarz v. Luskin, 560 So.2d 283 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (recording provides constructive notice in Florida context)
Townsend v. Morton, 36 So.3d 865 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (recording statute and notice considerations)
Sweat v. Yates, 463 So.2d 306 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (recording statute primarily protects bona fide purchasers and creditors)
Segal v. Rhumbline International, Inc., 688 So.2d 397 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (four-year vs discovery period; issue of discovery within statute)
Budhu v. Budhu, N.Y.S.2d 694 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011) (recording alone not sufficient to alert reasonably diligent person)
Bueneman v. Zykan, 181 S.W.3d 105 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (recording does not unilaterally commence limitations period)
Crescent v. White, 493 P.2d 1323 (Nev. 1972) (recording statute notice limitations for subsequent purchasers)
Villa Nat'l Bank v. Green, 478 P.2d 681 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970) (creditor notice threshold linked to recorded interest)
Elliott v. Goss, 108 S.E.2d 475 (N.C. 1959) (fraud accrues upon discovery of fraud, not mere recording)
Hair v. Schellenberger, 966 N.E.2d 693 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (recording date may be relevant but not controlling)
Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC, 39 So.3d 1216 (Fla. 2010) (treats complaint truth for purposes of dismissal)