Derry Lovins v. Tony Parker
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 6163
6th Cir.2013Background
- Lovins was convicted of second-degree murder in Tennessee in 2002 and his sentence was enhanced from 20 to 23 years based on judge-found aggravating factors.
- The sentencing enhancement proceeded without a jury, relying on Tennessee’s pre-Blakely sentencing scheme, later deemed unconstitutional.
- Blakely v. Washington (2004) held that certain aggravating facts must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt to raise punishment.
- Lovins’s direct appeal timeline tangled with postconviction review, with his direct appeal final in 2007 after re-opening; Gomez I was vacated and Gomez II recognized Blakely error.
- The last reasoned state-court decision denying Lovins relief on the Blakely issue was 2007, which held Blakely not retroactive to collateral review.
- The district court denied habeas relief on Lovins’s Blakely and other trial-error claims; the Court of Criminal Appeals and Tennessee Supreme Court denied relief on those issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Blakely applies retroactively to Lovins. | Lovins argues Blakely applies retroactively under Griffith/Teague. | State contends Blakely does not apply retroactively to collateral review. | Retroactivity applies; Blakely is retroactive on collateral review under Griffith/Teague analysis. |
| Whether Lovins properly exhausted and avoided procedural default for Blakely claim. | Lovins exhausted Blakely claim via postconviction relief proceedings. | State argues procedural default bars review due to failure to raise on direct appeal. | Procedural default does not bar review; Lovins exhausted the claim and the last state-court decision did not rely on an independent adequate state ground. |
| What is the proper retroactivity framework under AEDPA for Lovins’ claim. | AEDPA review uses last-state-merits adjudication with Teague Griffith interplay. | State argues lower retroactivity standards apply on collateral review. | Griffith/Teague retroactivity framework governs; Teague non-retroactivity does not bar Lovins given timing of finality. |
| What remedy is appropriate for the Blakely sentencing error. | Remand for resentencing or reduction to the presumptive twenty-year sentence. | Remand not necessary or a full new sentencing procedure may be allowed. | Remand for resentencing or reduction to twenty years is required. |
| Other trial-error claims (Brady disclosure, exclusion of testimony) succeed or fail. | Lovins seeks relief for Brady and denial-of-witness testimony claims. | State contends no merit or prejudice from disclosure or testimony issues. | No relief on Brady or witness testimony claims; district court’s denial affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (U.S. 2004) (aggravating facts must be found by a jury to raise penalty beyond the statutory maximum)
- Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (U.S. 2007) (vacated Gomez I; clarified Apprendi/Blakely framework for state sentencing)
- Gomez v. State, 239 S.W.3d 733 (Tenn. 2007) (Gomez II: Tennessee sentencing scheme violated Sixth Amendment as construed post-Blakely)
- Gomez v. State, 163 S.W.3d 632 (Tenn. 2005) (Gomez I: initially held Tennessee scheme did not violate Blakely)
- Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (U.S. 1987) (retroactivity floor for new federal rules in criminal procedure)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (U.S. 1989) (Teague non-retroactivity rule for new constitutional rules on collateral review)
- Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (U.S. 2008) (retains state-law latitude on retroactivity standards but sets floor via Griffith)
- O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (U.S. 1999) (exhaustion requirement for federal habeas review)
- Villagarcia v. Warden, 599 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2010) (harmless error standard for collateral review of sentencing reform)
- Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (U.S. 2011) (defining unreasonable application of federal law under AEDPA)