Derrick Estell v. United States, 924 F.3d 1291

Derrick Estell pleaded guilty (2014) to two counts under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) for using a firearm during a bank robbery (brandishing) and a carjacking, and was sentenced to 384 months’ imprisonment.
Estell filed a § 2255 motion arguing his § 924(c) convictions were invalid because the residual clause in § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague in light of Johnson v. United States.
The residual clause defines a “crime of violence” to include felonies that “by their nature, involve a substantial risk that physical force … may be used.” Estell argued this clause is void for vagueness and that his underlying offenses also fail the separate force clause (§ 924(c)(3)(A)).
The district court denied relief relying on United States v. Prickett, which held Johnson did not invalidate § 924(c)(3)(B). Estell appealed and the court granted a certificate of appealability.
The government conceded (for purposes of appeal) that the residual-clause argument might be viable, but argued both bank robbery and carjacking qualify as crimes of violence under the force clause because each includes elements of force or intimidation.
The Eighth Circuit relied on precedent (notably United States v. Harper and related decisions) to hold that intimidation in the robbery and carjacking statutes constitutes a threatened use of violent force, so both offenses qualify under § 924(c)(3)(A).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the residual clause in § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague and thus invalidates Estell’s § 924(c) convictions	Johnson and Dimaya logic renders the residual clause void for vagueness, so § 924(c) convictions cannot stand if they depended on that clause	Even if the residual clause were void, the convictions survive because the underlying offenses qualify under the force clause (§ 924(c)(3)(A))	Court affirmed district court; did not need to decide residual-clause validity because offenses qualify under the force clause
Whether bank robbery and carjacking categorically qualify as crimes of violence under the force clause (§ 924(c)(3)(A))	Estell: the “intimidation” element can be satisfied by reckless or negligent conduct and may not require violent physical force, so the offenses do not categorically meet the force-clause element	Government: statutes require force or intimidation (threat of force); intimidation necessarily conveys a threat of bodily harm and thus violent physical force, so both offenses qualify categorically	Held: bank robbery and carjacking qualify as crimes of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A); convictions affirmed

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (struck down a different ACCA residual clause as void for vagueness)
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (held another statutory residual clause unconstitutionally vague)
United States v. Prickett, 839 F.3d 697 (8th Cir. 2016) (concluded Johnson did not invalidate § 924(c)(3)(B))
United States v. Harper, 869 F.3d 624 (8th Cir. 2017) (held intimidation in bank robbery conveys threat of violent force for § 924(c) force-clause purposes)
United States v. Wright, 957 F.2d 520 (8th Cir. 1992) (recognized robbery elements include force or intimidation)
United States v. Yockel, 320 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2003) (discussed intent and intimidation in bank robbery)
Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (definition of “threat” turns on what is conveyed, not the speaker’s mental state)
United States v. Winston, 845 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2017) (explained that bodily injury requires use of force and supports treating threats of bodily harm as violent force)