Derek L. Moore v. State of Indiana
2015 Ind. App. LEXIS 361
Ind. Ct. App.2015Background
- Moore pleaded guilty in FB-7118 to three Robberies and two unlawful firearm possessions, plus habitual offender status, with an aggregate 60-year sentence imposed in 2006.
- Moore petitioned in 2014 for sentence modification under the revised I.C. 35-38-1-17(c) after the statute’s July 1, 2014 effective date.
- The trial court denied the petition, citing no authority without prosecutorial consent under the old statute, and noted the new law has no retroactive effect.
- Moore moved to correct error; the court again declined to entertain the petition or grant relief on the merits.
- Issues were framed as whether the revised statute provides procedural relief and whether Moore’s appeal is moot; the court addressed retroactivity and savings clause issues.
- The court ultimately held the revised statute applies to petitions filed after July 1, 2014, authorizing the court to entertain the petition without prosecutorial consent, but affirms denial on the merits due to the seriousness of Moore’s crimes.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the revised statute applies to Moore’s petition. | Moore argued the revision is procedural and retroactively applicable. | State argued savings clause bars retroactive application to pre-2014 convicted defendants. | Applied; statute governs petitioning process and is not barred. |
| Whether Moore’s appeal is moot. | If revised statute applies, Moore retains potential relief and appeal not moot. | Contends mootness since merits could be denied without relief. | Not moot; public-interest considerations apply; we proceed to merits. |
| Whether the trial court erred by denying modification absent prosecutorial consent under the revised statute. | Under the revised statute, court authority to modify does not require prosecutor consent. | Under old law, prosecutorial consent was required and the court lacked authority. | Court authority exists under the revised statute; however, ultimately denial affirmed on merits. |
Key Cases Cited
- Willis v. State, 567 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (procedural vs. substantive distinction central to retroactivity of modification statutes)
- Beanblossom v. State, 637 N.E.2d 1345 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (prosecutor consent is not a limit on the trial court’s power but a condition)
- Crocker, 270 Ind. 377, 385 N.E.2d 1143 (1979) (substantive change vs. procedural change in modification statute; retroactivity analysis)
- Payne v. State, 688 N.E.2d 164 (Ind. 1997) (sentencing rules governed by statute in effect at time of offense; general rule discussed)
- Willis (revisited) / Morris v. State, 936 N.E.2d 354 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (discussion of retroactivity and procedural vs. substantive changes to modification statute)
- Marley v. State, 17 N.E.3d 335 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (savings clause and amelioration doctrine context for retroactivity)