Deputy Chief Counsel for the Public Defender Division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services v. Acting First Justice of the Lowell Division of the District Court Department
477 Mass. 178
Mass.2017Background
- Massachusetts CPCS (Committee for Public Counsel Services) launched a pilot in the Lowell District Court drug court to assign counsel to indigent drug‑court participants at all stages, including staffings.
- The drug court model emphasizes a multidisciplinary, team‑based, nonadversarial approach led by the judge; defense counsel traditionally had no formal role post‑disposition unless a probation violation hearing arose.
- The Lowell First Justice removed a CPCS‑assigned attorney after a September 2015 incident and thereafter began refusing CPCS attorneys in drug court, ultimately imposing a categorical ban on CPCS assignments in that drug court.
- CPCS filed a G. L. c. 211, § 3 petition asking the Supreme Judicial Court to confirm CPCS’s exclusive authority under G. L. c. 211D to assign and supervise counsel for indigent defendants and to bar the judge from excluding CPCS attorneys or removing them without notice and a hearing.
- The SJC considered whether the judge’s interest in preserving a collaborative drug‑court team could override CPCS’s statutory authority to assign counsel to indigent defendants.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Who controls assignment of counsel for indigent criminal defendants in drug court? | CPCS: G. L. c. 211D and S.J.C. Rule 3:10 give CPCS sole, independent authority to assign counsel; judges must assign cases to CPCS. | Justice: As drug‑court team leader, the judge may favor volunteer team attorneys to preserve the nonadversarial model and select team members, including in probation‑violation matters. | Held: CPCS has exclusive authority to assign counsel; judge may not carve out a drug‑court exception. |
| May a judge remove or exclude CPCS‑assigned attorneys without process? | CPCS: Assigned counsel may be removed only for cause after notice and a hearing. | Justice: Implicit need to manage the drug‑court team may justify exclusion or removal to protect program fidelity. | Held: Judges cannot remove CPCS‑assigned counsel or categorically exclude CPCS attorneys without cause and due process. |
| Does the drug‑court team approach create an exception to statutory assignment procedures? | CPCS: No statutory exception; team‑based preferences cannot override the statutory scheme. | Justice: Team composition is an administrative function; fidelity to the model requires judge discretion in selecting team members, including counsel. | Held: No exception; administrative team selection cannot supersede CPCS’s statutory duty to assign counsel. |
| Are CPCS attorneys required to be nonadversarial team players in drug court? | CPCS: While collaborative participation is encouraged, attorneys retain duty to zealously represent clients; that role cannot be supplanted by the drug‑court model. | Justice: Effectiveness of drug court depends on collaborative, nonadversarial counsel willing to assume team role. | Held: The court acknowledged the value of the model but held it does not displace counsel’s advocacy duties or CPCS’s assignment authority. |
Key Cases Cited
- Pugliese v. Commonwealth, 335 Mass. 471 (recognition of right to counsel in certain cases)
- Brown v. Commonwealth, 335 Mass. 476 (art. 12 right to counsel; condemnation of unrepresented defendants)
- Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (right to counsel principle underpinning public defender systems)
- Abodeely v. County of Worcester, 352 Mass. 719 (payment rights for appointed private attorneys)
- D'Avella v. McGonigle, 429 Mass. 820 (courts may not carve exceptions from clear statutory mandates)
