Deptula v. Greene, 3:24-cv-01579

Petitioner Sebastian Deptula is incarcerated at the Low Security Correctional Facility, Allenwood, serving a 156-month federal sentence for wire fraud, with a projected release of May 13, 2026.
Deptula, a citizen of Poland, is subject to a final order of removal by the Department of Homeland Security and an immigration detainer has been lodged against him.
Deptula filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 seeking immediate placement in a Residential Reentry Center (RRC) or ICE custody, relying on alleged eligibility for early release credits under the First Step Act (FSA).
Administrative remedy records show Deptula did not fully exhaust the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) grievance process before bringing his habeas action, failing to complete appeals past the institutional and regional stages.
The government opposed the petition, arguing non-exhaustion and ineligibility for FSA earned time credits due to the final removal order.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Must exhaustion of BOP remedies occur?	Exhaustion should be excused as futile and slow.	Failure to exhaust; Petitioner did not complete steps.	Exhaustion required; no exception applies here.
Eligibility for FSA earned time credits	Deptula claims he qualifies for time credits & RRC.	Ineligibility due to final immigration removal order.	Ineligible for credits under FSA if removal ordered.
Effect of Loper Bright decision	BOP can't use 'alien' status post-Loper Bright case.	Loper Bright not relevant to statutory ineligibility.	Loper Bright inapplicable; statute is unambiguous.

Moscato v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757 (3d Cir. 1996) (exhaustion of administrative remedies required for federal prisoners seeking habeas corpus relief under § 2241)
Cal/wood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627 (3d Cir. 2000) (discussing exhaustion doctrine in federal habeas corpus context)
Bradshaw v. Carlson, 682 F.2d 1050 (3d Cir. 1981) (purposes and policy justifications for exhaustion of administrative remedies)