Dept. of Human Services v. H. C. W., 489 P.3d 139

Mother is a descendant member of the Karuk Tribe; the child (N) is the biological child of that mother and is eligible for Karuk "descendancy" membership but not for full enrolled membership (does not meet 1/8 blood quantum).
Karuk Tribe maintains two tiers of membership: fully enrolled members (blood-quantum requirement) and descendants (no blood-quantum requirement; limited benefits).
The Tribe notified the court that N was "Eligible for Descendancy" and its witness explained the tribal membership structure and the Tribe’s practice regarding descendants in dependency cases.
The juvenile court concluded N was not an "Indian child" under 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) because N was not eligible for full (enrolled) membership, and thus did not apply the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).
On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals held the statute’s plain text covers any type of tribal membership or eligibility, and ambiguities are construed in favor of tribal interests; it reversed and remanded.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a child who is eligible for a tribe's descendancy membership (but not full enrolled membership) qualifies as an "Indian child" under 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).	Mother: § 1903(4) requires only that the child be a member or eligible for membership; descendancy eligibility satisfies that.	DHS: Tribe’s membership tiers mean descendancy eligibility does not make a child an "Indian child" for ICWA purposes.	The statute’s text does not distinguish membership tiers; a child eligible for any tribal membership qualifies as an "Indian child." Reversed.
Whether a tribe’s view that a particular class of members are not "Indian children" controls ICWA applicability.	Mother: Tribe’s recognition of descendants as eligible supports ICWA applicability.	DHS: Follow the tribe’s (purported) position that descendants are not "Indian children."	Tribe’s determination of membership/eligibility is conclusive as a factual matter, but whether ICWA applies is a legal question for the court; a tribe cannot unilaterally override the statute’s terms.

Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. City of West Linn, 338 Or. 453 (2005) (describing federal‑statute construction methodology).
Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (courts normally give statutory terms their ordinary public meaning).
Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759 (1985) (ambiguities in statutes passed for tribes should be resolved in favor of tribal interests).
Native Vill. of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying the Blackfeet presumption to ICWA interpretation).
State ex rel. Juv. Dept. v. Tucker, 76 Or. App. 673 (1985) (tribal determination of membership is a factual determination on which the tribe’s word is conclusive).
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (tribes have sovereign authority to define membership).
Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax‑Free Trust, 579 U.S. 115 (2016) (courts must not rewrite statutes Congress enacted).
Matter of Dependency of Z. J. G., 471 P.3d 853 (Wash. 2020) (discussing ICWA’s remedial purpose to protect tribal communities).
Dept. of Human Services v. S. R. H., 278 Or. App. 427 (2016) (treatment of Karuk enrolled descendant members as "Indian Children" under ICWA).