510 S.W.3d 331
Mo.2017Background
- David and Natalie DePriest, brother and sister, were separately charged after police discovered a marijuana-growing operation and a firearm; both were represented by the same defense counsel.
- The State made joint plea offers conditioned on both siblings pleading; defense counsel advised both not to accept, contending Natalie’s case was much weaker than David’s.
- The State later offered Natalie a better deal in exchange for testifying against David and warned this created a conflict; defense counsel continued joint representation and did not withdraw.
- Both pleaded guilty at a group hearing to open pleas; the trial court did not inquire about any conflict of interest.
- Both were sentenced to 15-year terms (concurrent on counts I & II), and David received an additional consecutive weapon sentence; post-conviction motions (Rule 24.035) alleging ineffective assistance based on an actual conflict were denied without evidentiary hearings.
- The Supreme Court vacated those denials and remanded for evidentiary hearings, holding the amended motions pleaded facts sufficient to require hearings on whether an actual conflict adversely affected counsel’s representation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether motions pleaded facts showing an actual conflict of interest in joint representation that adversely affected counsel’s performance during plea negotiations | DePriest(s): counsel knew Natalie’s exposure was weaker, advised joint rejection of offers, and failed to uncouple or seek separate negotiations; State leveraged conflict to extract testimony from Natalie — these facts show an actual conflict that adversely affected representation | State: allegations do not conclusively prove an actual conflict or adverse effect; record shows movants knew counsel represented both, offers were withdrawn for independent reasons, and no clear prejudice is pled | Held: The amended motions pleaded sufficient facts to allege an actual conflict that could have adversely affected counsel’s performance; evidentiary hearings are required. |
| Whether a movant alleging an actual conflict must plead Strickland-style prejudice (i.e., but for counsel’s errors would not have pled guilty) | DePriest(s): where an actual conflict is shown, prejudice is presumed and the movant need not plead Strickland prejudice | State/Motion court: required movant to allege specific Strickland prejudice (reasonable probability would have gone to trial) | Held: For actual conflicts arising during joint representation, prejudice is presumed (Cuyler/Holloway). The motion court erred by applying ordinary Strickland pleading and denying hearings. |
| Whether the Mason/Mooring line (requiring demonstration counsel forebore a defense or acted detrimentally at trial) governs conflict claims in the guilty-plea context | DePriest(s): Mason/Mooring standards focus on trial conduct and are inapt for plea-stage conflicts where effects on advice and negotiation are not visible on trial record | State: relied on Mason/Mooring to argue more concrete showing required | Held: Mason/Mooring standard is inappropriate for guilty-plea conflict claims; plea-stage actual conflicts require only facts showing counsel acted under an actual conflict that adversely affected representation. |
| Whether the motion court may deny an amended Rule 24.035 motion without an evidentiary hearing when the record does not plainly and conclusively refute alleged facts | DePriest(s): record does not refute allegations; evidentiary hearing necessary to resolve credibility and proof | State: record and files refute or undermine allegations such that no hearing necessary | Held: The record and files do not plainly and conclusively refute the motions; remand for evidentiary hearings is required. |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (prejudice and performance standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (conflict-based ineffective assistance: actual conflict that adversely affects performance suffices and prejudice is presumed)
- Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (discussing the difficulty of proving prejudice from joint representation and presuming prejudice when an actual conflict exists)
- Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 133 (counsel’s failure to convey a plea offer — proving reasonable probability of acceptance and that plea would have been accepted by court/prosecution)
- Krupp v. State, 356 S.W.3d 142 (potential conflict alone does not invalidate a plea)
- LaFrance v. State, 585 S.W.2d 317 (explaining why trial-era conflict standards are ill-suited to plea-stage claims)
- Roberts v. State, 276 S.W.3d 883 (rules on when a post-conviction motion must be granted an evidentiary hearing)